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THE MORGENTALER CASE:
CRIMINAL PROCESS AND
ABORTION LAW
By BERNARD M. DIcKENs**
A. INTRODUCTION
An investigation of the sequence of events that posterity will know col-
lectively as The Morgentaler Case furnishes materials for a critical course of
studies in the Canadian criminal process from initial charge, through denial
of parole, to conduct of a re-trial, and perhaps even for a case-study in the
dynamics of law-reform. Reaction to the Morgentaler episode is neither
uniform nor complete, but when the social history of modem times comes to
be written, the name of Dr. Henry Morgentaler may appear as the name
not just of a person or of a judgment, but of a development in social attitude.
It may identify the moment when a woman's obligation to continue an un-
wanted pregnancy ceased to be merely her misfortune, and became recognized
as an injustice.1 Judicial and legislative accommodation to this development
is, however, still awaited; at present, it is expressed only by juries.
The continuing saga of Dr. Morgentaler has appeared regularly on Cana-
dian newspaper front-pages, and we know it well; so well, indeed, that for the
purposes of analysis in legal principle we need to defamiliarize ourselves and
** © Copyright, 1976, Bernard M. Dickens. The author is Visiting Research Pro-
fessor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.
The author is indebted to Mr. D. A. Rhydwen, Chief Librarian of the Toronto
Globe and Mail, for granting access to the newspaper's ifies.
I On the social effects of normative reclassification from misfortune to injustice,
see, R. H. Turner, The Theme of Contemporary Social Movements (1969), 20 Brit. J.
Sociol. 390.
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return to the original legal materials. In particular, we must consult the
language of the judgments given in the Supreme Court of Canada by the con-
curring Justices Pigeon and Dickson, and by the dissenting Chief Justice
Laskin. The implications of these judgments, and of the several earlier de-
cisions that were the procedural roots of the judicial plant that flowered in
Ottawa in March of 1975, are, however, worthy of more than lawyers' at-
tention, since they involve more than lawyers' interests. To set the scene, it is
desirable to tabulate in sequence the elements of the case. This may defy
attempts at objectivity, since the underlying abortion issues are those about
which individuals nurture as many feelings as thoughts, and the presentation
of elements must to a degree be subjective. Nevertheless, certain events appear
on record, and a presentation of legally significant components of the Morgen-
taler story can be based upon them.
B. SEQUENCE2
The commencement of the Morgentaler case will be taken here as the
first jury trial; events leading up to this will be described as occurring at the
pre-trial stage, even though involving numerous judicial proceedings. Similarly,
events after the Supreme Court's 1975 decision will be described as the after-
math, even though they include a subsequent jury trial and appeal, and re-trial
of the original indictment.
1. Pre-Trial
i) Dr. Henry Morgentaler, Vice-President of the Humanist Fellbwship
of Montreal, enters the public arena on the abortion issue by sub-
mitting a brief to the House of Commons Health and Welfare Com-
mittee, directed to elimination of "the illegal abortion racket."3
ii) Dr. Morgentaler establishes a Montreal clinic to apply the vacuum
aspiration technique of abortion, 1968.4
iii) Dr. Morgentaler, President of the Humanist Association of Canada,
asks Parliament that the proposed amendment to the Criminal Code
include total repeal of the abortion law.5
iv) Dr. Morgentaler seeks a meeting with the federal Minister of Justice
on the abortion law.0
v) Decision to charge Dr. Morgentaler on counts of conspiracy to commit
abortion7 and procuring abortion.8
2 This sequence aims to be in logical rather than strictly chronological order. When
an event was reported the following day in the Globe and Mail, the date of the event
will be given followed by an asterisk, e.g., August 15, 1973.*
3 Globe and Mail, October 20, 1967.
4 H. Morgentaler, Report on 5641 outpatient abortions by vacuum suction curettage,
109 Can. Med. Ass. J. 1202 (December 15, 1973).
B Globe and Mail, April 4, 1969.
6 Globe and Mail, May 15, 1970.
7 Criminal Code R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 423(1) (d). All references in this article
will be to the current edition of the Code (hereafter referred to as Code), even though
events at the time fell under the Criminal Code, 1943-54 (Can.) c. 51.8 Code, s. 251(1): s. 251 is the abortion section of the Criminal Code, although it.
describes the offence as procuring miscarriage.
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vi) Search warrant executed on Dr. Morgentaler's premises, with seizure
of documents and other effects, moneys, instruments and literature.
vii) Dr. Morgentaler arrested, June 4, 1970.9
viii) Arraignment and release on $2,000 bail, June 6, 1970.
ix) Counsel representing Dr. Morgentaler at arraignment called as witness
for the prosecution, June 10, 1970.10
x) Preliminary inquiry before Fauteux, J., Sess., June 12, 1970:
a) prosecution granted request for in camera hearing;1
b) defence request for postponement on grounds of unavailability of
alternative defence counsel 2 denied, but defence allowed half-day
adjournment, then extended over the week-end;
c) subpoena served on defence counsel cancelled.
xi) Preliminary inquiry continues, June 15, 1970. Fauteux, J., Sess., orders
("invites") the accused to make a voluntary statement under s.
469 (1) .13
xii) Defence application to Quebec Court of Queen's Bench for writs of
prohibition and certiorari to quash the order June 16, 1970.14
xiii) Application amended, July 14, 1970.
xiv) Desaulniers, J., on July 20, 1970:
a) transmits the application to the Superior Court for further in-
vestigation;
b) grants certiorari since Fauteux, J., Sess., misconducted June 15, 1970
hearing (complaint of "continual interruptions" during testimony);
c) orders Fauteux, J., Sess., to suspend further proceedings.
xv) Applications made before Shorteno, J., Quebec Court of Queen's
Bench, September 25, 1970:
a) that the writ of certiorari be declared final and binding;
b) that judgment be quashed and annulled;
c) that nothing be done in furtherance of the said judgment, nor of
the preliminary inquiry into the charges;
d) That s. 465 (1) (j) of the Criminal Code be declared ultra vires
null, void and inoperative inasmuch as it contravenes the British
North America Act 1867;
e) that s. 465(1) (j) be declared inoperative inasmuch as it abrogates,
9 Globe and Mail, July 21, 1970.
10 For adverse comment on this tactic, see, Shorteno, J., in R. v. Fauteux, ex p.
Morgentaler (1971), 3 C.C.C. (2d) 187 at 195.
1 Under the Code, ss. 442, 465(1) (j); see, Id. at 196.
12 For circumstances, see, Id. at 194-95.
13 Id. at 189. The judge in these proceedings did not commit Dr. Morgentaler to
stand trial.
14 Under the Ontario Criminal Appeal Rules, the procedure for certiorari is called
a motion to quash; see Ontario Annual Practice 1975, 608-09.
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abridges and infringes the right to a fair and public hearing as
provided by the Canadian Bill of Rights.'5
xvi) Judgment, October 30, 1970:16
a) dismissing applications; 17
b) discharging the writ of certiorari;
c) finding aparent illegality by improper use of search warrant, en-
abling those executing it to go on a "fishing expedition", seizing
everything they thought "was good for the case", without regard
to relevance to the charge under which the search warrant was
obtained; 8
d) finding the postponement refused "should have been granted in
fairness to the accused and to his counsel.' 19
xvii) Appeal to Quebec Court of Appeal against dismissal and discharge
dismissed, October 25, 1971.20
xviii) Papers filed with Supreme Court of Canada for leave to appeal de-
cision, November 25, 1971.
xix) Supreme Court refused leave, January 25, 1972.21
xx) Dr. Morgentaler continues to practise abortion, claiming at later trial
to have performed between 6,000 and 7,000 procedures "during the
past few years."22
2. Jury Trial
i) Seventeen police23 enter Dr. Morgentaler's clinic during his sixth
abortion operation of the morning of August 15, 1973*. Arrest of
Dr. Morgentaler, eleven patients, three nurses and a receptionist, and
removal of equipment (three vacuum suction apparatuses). 24
ii) Dr. Morgentaler arraigned and returned to jail pending bail hearing,
August 16, 1973*.
iii) Cousineau, J., grants bail August 19, 1973*, on conditions that Dr.
Morgentaler:
a) respects the law;
b) remains in Montreal;
c) does not contact prosecution witnesses;
15 R.S.C. 1970, Appendix M.
16 Supra, note 10.
17 Certiorari was held at best premature, since the judge had not yet decided whether
or not to commit for trial; supra, note 13.
18 Supra, note 10 at 193.
1 Id. at 195.20 Morgentaler v. M. Le Juge Fauteux, Rec. de Jurispr., [1972] C.A. 219.
2 1 Morgentaler v. Fauteux, Sup. Ct. Can. Rep. 1972, iii.
22 Globe and Mail, November 1, 1973.
2 Marq de Villiers, Globe and Mail Weekend Magazine, September 14, 1974.
24 Globe and Mail, June 11, 1975.
[VOL. 14, NO. 2
The Morgentaler Case
d) does not comment publicly on charges against him;
e) does not meet with newsmedia reporters; and
f) holds no news conferences.
iv) Indictment preferred by Quebec Attorney General, Jerome Choquette,
in person, under s. 507(3), regarding twelve charges of performing
an illegal abortion, August 29, 1973.25
v) Rothman, J., in the Quebec Court of Queen's Bench rejects an ap-
plication for certiorari to quash the indictment, September 21, 1973.20
vi) Supreme Court of Canada refuses leave to appeal against decision of
Rothman, J., October 2, 1973.27
vii) Upon arraignment on six charges before Hugessen, A.CJ., Quebec
Court of Queen's Bench, October 3, 1973,28 accused moves to quash
the indictment on the grounds that:
a) s. 251 is unconstitutional and ultra vires the Parliament of Canada
since it concerns health matters, which are reserved to provincial
legislation;29
b) s. 251 is inoperative under and repugnant to the Bill of Rights;
c) use of the preferred indictment procedure was improper, denying
the accused the right to a preliminary inquiry.
Motions dismissed, jury trial to commence.
viii) First day of trial, October 18, 1973*:
a) All but one of the six charges dropped following Hugessen, A.C.J.,
granting earlier defence motion;
b) French-speaking jury sworn, eleven men and one woman.
ix) Defence challenges qualifications of prosecution's expert witnesses,
November 2, 1973. Challenge dismissed.30
x) Defence motion to reopen defence case at conclusion of prosecution
rebuttal. Reopening not allowed, but defence permitted to call witness
in counter-rebuttal, November 7, 1973.31
xi) Prosecution motions that evidence for defence based on s. 4532 be
25 See, generally, 119 Can. H. of C. Debates (July 15, 1975) at 7614, per Paul
Dick, M.P.
2 6 Noted in R. v. Morgentaler (No. 1) (1973), 42 D.L.R. (3d) 424 at 435.
27 Sup. Ct. Can. Rep. 1973, xii.
2 8 Supra, note 26.
29 This article does not consider constitutional arguments raised in the case, but
for an informative article that does, see, J. P. Maksymiuk, The Abortion Law: A Study
of R. v. Morgentaler (1974-75), 39 Sask. L. R. 257.
30 R. v. Morgentaler (No. 2) (1973), 42 D.L.R. (3d) 439.
31 R. v. Morgentaler (No. 3) (1973), 42 D.L.R. (3d) 441.
32 Section 45 provides that "every one is protected from criminal responsibility for
performing a surgical operation upon any person for the benefit of that person if:
(a) the operation is performed with reasonable care and skill, and
(b) it is reasonable to perform the operation, having regard to the state of health
of the person at the time the operation is performed and to all the circum-
stances of the case."
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excluded (October 24, 1973), and that the s. 45 defence not be left
with the jury (November 7, 1973) rejected, November 7, 1973.M
xii) Charge to the jury, including directions on:
a) the defence of necessity (a common law defence, admissible under
s. 7(3),34 and
b) the defence under s. 45, November 12, 197 3*.35
xiii) While considering their decision, the jury returned to ask a number of
questions, principally regarding the s. 45 defence. 6
xiv) After a total of almost ten hours' deliberation, jury returned verdict
acquittal, November 13, 1973*.
3. Pre-Appeal
i) Prosecutor notified intention to appeal on 15 points of law. 7
ii) Dr. Morgentaler remained on bail on outstanding charges.
iii) Prosecutor sought:
a) order to stop Dr. Morgentaler from performing abortions pending
outcome of appeal, and
b) order committing Dr. Morgentaler to jail for breach of bail con-
ditions in addressing public meeting and news media.
Lamb, J., of the Quebec Superior Court, refused orders, November
28, 1973*.
iv) Dr. Morgentaler served with judgment signed in Quebec Superior Court
ordering him to pay the provincial government $354,799 in additional
tax for the years 1969-72, based on his claim at trial of performing up
to 7,000 operations, at an assessed average of $200 each, February 13,
1974:.
v) Based on judgment, provincial tax inspectors seized Dr. Morgentaler's
professional and private documents, diaries and tapes, and closed his
bank acount.
4. Quebec Court of Appeal
i) Prosecutor appealed from acquittal on grounds of trial judge's errors
of law: 8
33 R. v. Morgentaler (No. 4) (1973), 42 D.L.R. (3d) 444.
34 Section 7(3) provides that "Every rule and principle of the common law that
renders any circumstances a justification or excuse for an act or a defence to a charge
continues in force and applies in respect of proceedings for an offence under this Act
or any other Act of the Parliament of Canada, except in so far as they are altered by
or are inconsistent with this Act or any other Act of the Parliament of Canada."
8s R. v. Morgentaler (No. 5) (1973), 42 D.L.R. (3d) 448.
86 (1973), 42 D.L.R. (3d) 455.
87 Globe and Mail, November 17, 1973.
88 The prosecution may appeal against acquittal on indictment on "a question of
law alone"; s. 605(1) (a).
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a) in not restricting the defendant's means of defence to those set
out in s. 251 (4) ;s3
b) in deciding that the s. 45 defence could be invoked;
c) in submitting this means of defence to the jury.
ii) Court holds that:
a) where s. 251 procedure is unavailable, the necessity defence is
allowed under s. 7(3), which defence seems co-extensive with the
"reasonable surgical operation" defence under s. 45. The defendant
must show actual, urgent danger to his patient (per Casey and
Rinfret, JJA.);
b) s. 45 cannot be invoked to circumvent s. 251; a necessity defence
must show impossibility of compliance with s. 251 (per Crate,
B61anger and Dub6, J.A.);
c) a properly directed jury would have concluded that Dr. Morgen-
taler's conduct, in not conforming to s. 251(4), did not meet the
tests of necessity allowed by s. 7(3).
iii) Court allows appeal and enters conviction under s. 613(4) (b) (i)
with direction to trial judge to pass sentence,40 April 25, 1974.41
5. Post-Appeal and Sentence
i) Dr. Morgentaler appeals to the Supreme Court of Canada against
Court of Appeal judgment.
ii) Trial judge Hugessen, A.CJ., refuses:
a) to pass sentence, doubting his jurisdiction since pending Supreme
Court appeal may succeed;
b) to grant prosecution's petition to place Dr. Morgentaler in custody
(with other charges pending), because he is eligible for bail pend-
ing disposal of Supreme Court appeal. May 2, 1974*.
iii) Quebec Court of Appeal orders:
a) that Hugessen, A.C.J., impose sentence;
b) that Dr. Morgentaler be taken into custody since, having been
convicted, he no longer enjoys the presumption of innocence.
May 14, 1974".
iv) Dr. Morgentaler seeks leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against
the order.4
39 Section 251(4) exempts from criminal liability for abortion "a qualified medical
practitioner, other than a member of a therapeutic abortion committee for any hospital,
who in good faith uses in an accredited or approved hospital any means for the purpose
of carrying out his intention to procure the miscarriage of a female person... if, before
the use of those means, the therapeutic abortion committee for that accredited or ap-
proved hospital, by a majority of the members of the committee" has certified "that in
its opinion the continuation of the pregnancy of such female person would or would be
likely to endanger her life or health."
4 0 R. v. Ashcroft, Toth and King, [1966] 4 C.C.C. 27 held that an appeal court may
remit a case to the trial court for sentence.
4 1 R. v. Morgentaler (No. 5) (1974), 47 D.L.R. (3d) 211.
42 Refusal on June 3, 1974, Sup. Ct. Can. Rep. 1974 at x.
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v) Dr. Morgentaler detained in Montreal's Parthenais maximum security
prison, May 16, 1974*.
vi) Pre-sentence representations opened before Hugessen, A.C.J., May
22, 1974*.
vii) Montgomery, J., of Quebec Court of Appeal, hears bail application,
May 22, 1974*.
viii) Bail granted at $25,000, May 26, 1974.43
ix) Dr. Morgentaler announces the end of his clinic's operations, May 30,
1974*.
x) Supreme Court rejects appeal, orders Dr. Morgentaler return before
trial judge for sentence, June 3, 1974*.
xi) Pre-sentence hearings continue, July 11, 1974*.
xii) Sentence announced July 25, 1974*44 that:
a) 18 months' imprisonment be served;
b) three years' probation follow release, during which Dr. Morgentaler
be precluded from using any means to procure abortion except
in an accredited hospital;
c) Dr. Morgentaler remain on $25,000 bail pending Supreme Court
decision.
xiii) Dr. Morgentaler applies unsuccessfully to Hugessen, A.C.J., for order
that revenue authorities return seized property, July 25, 1974*.45
6. Supreme Court of Canada
i) Dr. Morgentaler enters appeal on questions of law as of right under
s. 618 (2), challenging conviction.
ii) Laskin, C.J.C., allows argument on constitutional points to be sub-
mitted at trial by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, the Founda-
tion for Women in Crisis and the Alliance For Life, September 3,
1974*. Permission extended to L'Association des M~decins du Quebec
pour le Respect de la Vie, Le Front Commun pour le Respect de la
Vie, and La Fondation pour la Vie, September 10, 1974*.46
iii) Dr. Morgentaler appeals on the grounds that:
a) s. 251 is invalid as an encroachment on provincial legislative power
regarding hospitals and regulation of the profession and practice
of medicine;
43 Globe and Mail, July 12, 1974.
44 R. v. Morgentaler, Quebec Court of Queen's Bench (Crown Side) (unreported)
No. 01, 8039-73. For judicial observations at sentence, see, Globe and Mail, August 3,
1974.
4 5 For more details, see, supra, note 23.
40 See, generally, Bernard M. Dickens, A Canadian Development: Non-Party Inter-
vention (1976), 39 Modem L.R. (pp. pending).
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b) sections 1(a) and (b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights,47 derived
from the United States Constitution, import into Canadian law
United States' decisional law giving effect to the United States
Constitution, notably the decisions in Roe v. Wade4" and Doe v.
Bolton 49
c) under section 1 (a) of the Bill of Rights, women have a right of
privacy including at least a qualified right to pregnancy termination,
especially in the first trimester;
d) s. 251 infringes section 1 (a) of the Bill of Rights regarding pro-
tection of security of the person by due process of law because the
standard in s. 251(4) 5 is so vague, so uncertain and so subjective
among different physicians and therapeutic abortion committees
as to deny due process of law;5'
e) there is further denial of due process in failure to provide adequate
procedural safeguards in s. 251 whereby an applicant may appear,
with counsel if she wishes, before a therapeutic abortion committee;
f) since there is a right to abortion under certain conditions without
risking criminal penalty, there is a right to a fair hearing thereon
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice established
by section 2(e) of the Bill of Rights;
g) equality before the law and to the protection of the law under
section 1 (b) are denied because s. 251(4), in permitting but not
compelling the establishment of therapeutic abortion committees,
operates unequally in respect of women in rural areas, women in
areas where no such committees have been established and women
whose economic status prevents them going to areas where such
committees exist, and creates inequality because the vague standard
set leads inevitably to varying interpretations and applications;
h) due process under section 1 (a) is also denied for absence of review
of therapeutic abortion committees, having regard to grounds d)
and e) supra, and the absence of reasons for their decisions; the
failure to require reasons is itself a denial of due process of law;
i) prevention of a woman from having, and of a physician from per-
forming, a safe abortion by medically proven techniques constitutes
cruel and unusual treatment; and prevention of the physician from,
and his punishment for, performing a consensual operation which
47 Supra, note 15, recognizing "without discrimination by reason of race, national
origin, colour, religion or sex... (a) the right of the individual to life, liberty, security
of the person and enjoyment of property, and the right not to be deprived thereof except
by due process of law; (b) the right of the individual to equality before the law and the
protection of the law."
48 (1973), 410 U.S. 113 (U.S. Sup. Ct.).
49 (1973), 410 U.S. 179 (U.S. Sup. Ct.).
5
o Supra, note 39: "would or would be likely to endanger her life or health".
51 For early and instructive evidence of how Canadian committees operate, see, K.
D. Smith and H. S. Wineberg, A Survey of Therapeutic Abortion Committees (1970),
12 Crim. L.Q. 279.
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is, in his judgment, in the best interests of his patient, is cruel and
unusual punishment;
j) even if the Bill of Rights is merely an aid to interpretation, it
supports resort to s. 45 as a defence to a charge under s. 251
(submitted by counsel for the Foundation for Women in Crisis);
k) since the prosecution was initiated by a preferred indictment, the
Attorney General of Quebec was under a duty to act judicially,
and had not so acted;
1) s. 507(3), permitting preferred indictments, is in conflict with
section 1(b) of the Bill of Rights as being a denial of equality
before the law and of the protection of the law;
m) operations performed by Dr. Morgentaler fall outside the intend-
ment of s. 251, which is confined to procuring miscarriage;
n) the Quebec Court of Appeal was incorrect in rejecting the reasoning
of the trial judge to admit the s.45 defence;
o) the Quebec Court of Appeal was incorrect in finding no evidentiary
basis for a necessity defence under s. 7(3);52
p) it was for the jury to say whether the circumstances of the abortion
constituted an emergency giving rise to a necessity such that s.
251(4) could not be employed;
q) the Quebec Court of Appeal cannot substitute a conviction for
a jury's acquittal, or, if it can, it was not appropriate to do so
in this case.
iv) Laskin, C.J.C., for the court, dismissed the appeal on the constitutional
and constructional grounds, (a-m), March 26, 1975. 1
v) Laskin, C.J.C., Judson and Spence, JJ., concurring, dissented from the
majority of the court, holding that the acquittal be restored, since:
a) section 45 is not inapplicable under s. 251;
b) in this case, there was evidence for the jury to consider which
could satisfy the objective requirement of s. 45; the trial judge
therefore properly left the matter with them;
c) there was evidence fit to go to the jury upon the common law
defence of necessity;54
d) it was for the jury to say whether the emergency made it impossible
to observe s. 251(4).
vi) The majority of the court (Martland, Ritchie, Pigeon, Dickson, Beetz
and de Grandpr6, JJ.) dismissed the appeal and upheld conviction
on the grounds that:
a) s. 45 cannot in law apply so as to relieve criminal liability under
s. 251;
52 It may be questioned whether this is really a question of law, but see, the "no
evidence" rule, infra, note 148.
t; (1975), 53 D.L.R. (3d) 161.
54 Notably evidence of the threat of the woman's self-induced or "backstreet"
abortion, or suicide; see, infra, note 172.
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b) while the necessity defence is preserved in principle, there was in
this case a total absence of evidence of the urgent necessity which
may, very exceptionally, justify a violation of the criminal law;
c) in the total absence of such evidence, the trial judge should have
refrained from putting the necessity defence to the jury;
d) s. 613(4) (b) (i) specifically empowered the appeal court, upon
allowing the prosecution's appeal, to enter a verdict of guilty;
e) since the s. 251(4) defence was not advanced, the s. 45 defence
was not available, and the s. 7(3) necessity defence was supported
by no evidence, these defences to the evidence of guilt could not
prevail; the only conclusion is that the accused is guilty.
7. Imprisonment (and release)
i) Dr. Morgentaler enters Bordeaux Jail, Quebec, March 27, 1975.rr
ii) Removal at own request to minimum security Waterloo Rehabilitation
Centre.56
iii) Dr. Morgentaler alleges instance of denial of medicine for his heart
condition, in letter dated June 8, 1975, smuggled from prison. r7
iv) Dr. Morgentaler involved in altercation with guards, and placed in
solitary confinement, June 12, 1975.58
v) Removal to Shefford General Hospital intensive care ward following
suspected heart attack, June 16, 1975*.
vi) Removal to the University Medical Centre, Sherbrooke.5"
vii) Application for parole after third of sentence served, as of September,
1975.10
viii) Removal to Town of Mount Royal prison convalescent home.
ix) National Parole Board of five members turns down parole, September
8, 1975*, due to prisoner's behaviour in prison, other charges pending,
and "a whole series of factors".
x) Request to Board to reconsider September 8, 1975 rejection of applica-
tion, January 12, 1976*.
xi) Release on unconditional bail pending re-trial, January 26, 1976'".
xii) Quebec Court of Appeal finds Superior Court lacked bail jurisdiction
and grants bail itself in the sum of $500, but on conditions that Dr.
Morgentaler not perform abortions except in accredited hospitals, and
not speak publicly about the re-trial or about Canadian abortion laws,
February 17, 1976*.
55 Globe and Mail, March 31, 1975.
56 Globe and Mail, May 17, 1975.
57 Globe and Mail, June 18, 1975.
58 Globe and Mail, June 17, 1975.
59 Globe and Mail, June 19, 1975.
60 Globe and Mail, June 20, 1975.
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8. The Aftermath
a) Procedural
i) Quebec Attorney General Jerome Choquette denies intent to prosecute
further charges against Dr. Morgentaler, stating "'11 leave him alone
for now. I have no intention of going after him. I don't want to
humiliate him any more." April 20, 1975*.
ii) Quebec Attorney General personally signs preferred indictment bring-
ing Dr. Morgentaler to court to fix date for hearing of further charges,
May 5, 1975*.
iii) Bisson, J., of the Quebec Superior Court, rejects prosecution request
that five abortion charges be tried together, ordering one to be chosen
to be pursued, May 26, 1975*.
iv) Dr. Morgentaler arraigned before Quebec Court of Queen's Bench
upon the charge that on August 15, 1973 he performed an illegal
abortion, May 29, 1975*.
a) French-speaking jury sworn, seven men, five women.
b) Defence argues only necessity under s. 7(3), alleging medical
necessity, urgency, and that s. 251(4) operation exceptionally
difficult to obtain in Montreal.61
v) Bisson, J., directs the jury that the "defence of necessity.., is not avail-
able to the accused in this case," June 9, 1975*.
vi) After 55 minutes' deliberation, the jury returns a verdict of acquittal,
June 9, 1975*.
vii) Prosecution
a) appeals to Quebec Court of Appeal against acquittal;
b) lays ten other charges (nine regarding August 15, 1973, one re-
garding an incident in 1970) by four preferred indictments signed
in person by the Quebec Attorney General, June 10, 1975*.62
viii) Prosecution granted postponement of trial of the ten charges, pending
Quebec Court of Appeal decision, January 5, 1976.6
ix) Prosecution appeals on grounds of the trial judge's errors of law in:
a) not ordering a mistrial when the defence lawyer appeared on tele-
vision and alleged persecution of his courageous client;
b) ordering the prosecution to proceed on only one charge instead
of five;
c) not ordering the jury to find Dr. Morgentaler guilty because he
had admitted his guilt;
d) allowing defence counsel twice to mention indirectly that his client
faced life imprisonment on the charge;
01 Globe and Mail, June 5, 1975.
02 See, generally, Paul Dick, M., supra, note 25.
03 Globe and Mail, January 7, 1976.
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e) allowing the defendant to use the defence of necessity.64
x) Quebec Court of Appeal dismisses appeal and upholds jury verdict,
January 20, 1976*, finding:
a) evidence of necessity,
b) error to detriment of the defence in Bisson, J., directing the jury
that the necessity defence was unavailable,
c) the discretion to order trial on one charge only was properly
exercised.
xi) Federal Minister of Justice, Ronald Basford, sets aside conviction on
the original indictment, and orders re-trial, January 22, 1976*.6 5
xii) Prosecution states intention to appeal to Supreme Court of Canada
against Quebec Court of Appeal upholding jury acquittal, February
9, 1976".
xiii) Supreme Court of Canada refuses to allow prosecution leave to appeal,
March 15, 1976-.
xiv) On re-trial of original indictment, jury acquits, September 18, 1976.*
xv) Dr. Morgentaler ordered to appear on November 2, 1976 to face up
to eight further charges, September 18, 1976.*
b) Legislative
i) Federal Minister of Justice, Otto Lang, proposes legislative amendment
of s. 613(4) (b) to prevent jury acquittal again being reversed on
appeal, July 3, 1975.6
ii) Bill C-71, Omnibus bill to amend the Criminal Code, introduced July
17, 1975. Clause 75 proposes to amend s. 613(4) (b) by allowing a
Court of Appeal
i) to order a new trial or
ii) enter a verdict of guilty, except where the verdict successfully ap-
pealed is that of a judge and jury.
c) Administrative
i) Quebec Justice Department undertakes to have jury system reviewed
by the civil law revision board in the light of trials going against the
judges' instructions. 7
ii) Federal Minister of Justice appoints three-member departmental com-
mittee, the Committee on the Operation of the Abortion Law, under
Professor Robin Badgley6s to report, in June, 1976, on the operation
and long-term implications of the abortion law as reconstituted in
84 Globe and Mail, January 21, 1976.
65 Code, s. 617(a). The date of re-trial was subsequently set for June 21, 1976, but
then adjourned to September, 1976, due to the pregnancy of the principal prosecution
witness, and judicial unwillingness to employ transcript of the trial, September 8, 1976.
66 119 Can. H. of C. Debates (July 3, 1975) at 7232.
67 Globe and Mail, June 11, 1975.
68 University of Toronto sociologist and behavioural scientist.
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1969, to see if the law "is operating equitably across Canada," Sep-
tember 26, 1975.- 9
iii) Badgley Committee Report pending October, 1976.
d) Professional
i) 116 doctors in Quebec sign statement that they performed abortions
or helped females obtain abortions, outside s. 251(4), May, 1975.70
ii) Total of signing doctors rises to over 200. Police in Quebec undertake
to visit all the doctors, July 30, 1975*.
iii) Quebec College of Medicine disciplinary committee takes proceedings
against Dr. Morgentaler for licence revocation for violating medical
ethics, November 13, 1975".
iv) College orders licence suspension for 12 months and that Dr. Morgen-
taler be required to undergo a refresher course before resuming
practice, because of his prior over-specialization.71
C. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
1. Generally
The Morgentaler case reveals such a wealth of legally significant issues,
great and small, that the isolation of only certain of them may fail to do
justice to the case as an instrument for the observation of critical points
throughout the operation of the criminal process. There is a sense, for instance,
in which the initial decision to charge Dr. Morgentaler, reached by the Quebec
Minister of Justice and Attorney General, was a political product of Dr.
Morgentaler's own public challenge to the law. In contesting the apparent
meaning of the terms of the law under conscientious compulsions, he adopted
a political posture, and conditioned a political response. Indeed, had he re-
mained uncharged, not just his doctrinal opponents would have considered
the Quebec law-enforcement administration remiss or timorous in its duty.
Had the dissenting opinion of Laskin, C.J.C., in the Supreme Court prevailed,
the Minister would have incurred little adverse criticism for having taken up
the gauntlet that Dr. Morgentaler consciously and constantly threw down.
The case was not prosecuted, however, as a routine proceeding. Public
comment by the Quebec Minister of Justice and Attorney General, Jerome
Choquette, suggested that he considered the case a crusade, with no require-
ment that grace or magnanimity be offered, and adherents to Dr. Morgentaler's
09 Globe and Mail, October 16, 1975, and 119 Can. F. of C. Debates, (October 15,
1975) at 8230. The committee later found it impossible to report before September, 1976.
70 Globe and Mail, July 25, 1975.
71 Globe and Mail, January 23, 1976. The proceedings were compelled by the re-
quirement to investigate an instance of a physician being convicted in legal proceedings.
In 1970, the Canadian Medical Association deleted reference to abortion from its Code
of Ethics. The Code provides that "An Ethical Physician ... when his personal morality
prevents him from recommending some form of therapy which might benefit his patient
will so acquaint the patient."
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cause responded by complaining of his persecution.7 2 The federal Minister
of Justice and Attorney General, Otto Lang, through his parliamentary and
media responses failed to remove the impression that his private convictions
on the case coloured his public attitude. His initial refusal to see any threat
to the historic jury system in the Court of Appeal's power to impose con-
viction reversing jury acquittal,73 and his later concession that s. 613(4) (b)
of the Criminal Code permitting such reversal should be amended,7 gave
further weight to belief of his partiality.
In so far as his approach was personally adverse to Dr. Morgentaler's
conduct, however, he found support in the courts, and a constituency in the
country at large, where the faction characterizing the Montreal physician as
a martyr was countered by a faction seeing him as tantamount to a child-
killer. Indeed, the entire sequence of trial events was acted out against a
backdrop of factional lobbying, which took over the stage itself when the
Supreme Court admitted non-parties' representations on constitutional issues.70
The lobbying persists, and comment on the case and its implications is prone
to be seen in partisan terms. There are certain elements contained within the
events that can be isolated and considered in both principle and detail, how-
ever, notwithstanding that interpretation of their relation to the case as a
whole depends on attitudes not objective in their nature.
More peripheral issues wtihin the sequence of events in the Morgentaler
case need not be relegated to a position of secondary legal significance. The
defendant's case sounded stirring and even heroic central themes, such as the
Bill of Rights' promise of equal and open justice, and the British North
America Act's safeguarding of provincial rights over health care.76 No less
important, however, are constitutional considerations of free-speech first raised
by the August 1973 bail conditions requiring that Dr. Morgentaler refrain
from public comment on abortion law and decline to meet reporters from the
mass media. This restraint was possibly justifiable in terms of preserving the
integrity of jury trial against artificially stimulated publicity, although it may
be doubted that contempt of court provisions require this reinforcement.
Further, the conditions appear somewhat ironic in their presupposition that the
jury's verdict would be decisive, and oppressive in their obstruction of public
access to information from Dr. Morgentaler, who held office as President of
the Humanist Association of Canada. This gagging order's potential for
oppressive employment was advertized in the prosecution's application of
November 28, 1973 for Dr. Morgentaler's imprisonment for its breach,
pending the prosecutor's appeal after the first jury acquittal; rejection of this
application spared it the exposure that it was sufficiently objectionable to
warrant.77 Outrage was more widely expressed against the Quebec Court of
72 See, for instance, 119 Can. H. of C. Debates (May 29, 1975) at 6250, per Stuart
Leggatt, M.P.; see, also, id. at 6679 (June 12, 1975), per J. G. Diefenbaker, M.P.
73 Id. at 4676 (April 10, 1975).
74 Id. at 7232 (July 3, 1975).
75 Infra, and supra, note 46.76 Supra, note 29.
77 An application before jury trial might be defensible in order to punish an attempt
to influence potential jurymembers, but it may be doubted that appellate judges need to
be similarly protected from the influence of the newsmedia upon their decision.
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Appeal's imposition of a similar restraint on freedom of speech in its bail
conditions of February 17, 1976, pending re-trial on the initial charge.
Similarly, the case highlights the autocratic powers of the National Parole
Board. The Board rejected Dr. Morgentaler's parole application upon loosely
presented grounds,78 including his behaviour as a prisoner, when his treatment
by prison officers, which would clearly interact with his behaviour and its
official assessment, remained a matter of considerable controversy. Parlia-
mentary calls for an inquiry into the circumstances of treatment and conduct,79
which would concern most publicly constituted bodies, evoked no apparent
response of caution from the Board.80 Their determination to treat Dr.
Morgentaler as any other prisoner was contradicted, however, by his case
being considered not by two Board members, as is usual, but by five. Further,
the contributory reason for refusing parole, that further charges were pending,
raises in principle the question of whether this justifies the detention of an
individual who was granted bail when the same charges were pending prior
to a conviction, and shows the prosecutor's extra-judicial influence over a
prisoner by merely formally commencing further proceedings.
An interesting procedural aspect of the Supreme Court appeal was the
admission of non-parties s' to urge their contentions not on the merits of Dr.
Morgentaler's conduct, but on constitutional points advanced at earlier pro-
ceedings. The Court's willingness to receive contentions by written briefm2
and oral advocacy from non-parties was seen by some commentators as an
innovation in criminal proceedings8 3 In fact, the Supreme Court had allowed
a non-party to intervene in 1963,84 but the initiative taken on a large scale
78 Which they did not give to the applicant, nor to his lawyer; the Board let the
applicant hear their decision on his future through the newsmedia following a press re-
lease. The Globe and Mail, January 7, 1976.
79 119 Can. H. of C. Debates (June 18, 1975) at 6871, per Robert Stanfield, M.P.
89Laskin, C.J.C., in Mitchell v. The Queen, [19751 24 C.C.C. (2d) 241 at 245,
finding that "The plain fact is that the [National Parole] Board claims a tyrannical
authority that I believe is without precedent among administrative agencies empowered
to deal with a person's liberty. It claims an unfettered power to deal with an inmate,
almost as if he were a mere puppet on a string." It seems indefensible to delay a remedy
to this position, but the proposed Criminal Law Amendment Act (No. 1), 1976 is de-
signed to provide that "Some procedural safeguards will be introduced ... to ensure that
the process by which the Board reaches its decisions will meet the expectations of natural
justice. These will include assistance to the applicant, further information to the applicant
and stated reasons for refusal of parole. These will be defined in regulations and will
be phased in over a period of several years." (The Highlights of the Peace and Security
Program, Dept. of Justice, Ottawa, 1976) at 7.
81 That is, other than a provincial or the federal Attorney General.
82 Submission was not confined to those permitted to address the court orally.
Professor Cyril C. Means, Jr. of New York Law School submitted a lengthy brief for
applicability of the s. 45 defence on historical grounds. This may have influenced Laskin,
CJ.C., but Pigeon, J., found it "unnecessary to consider the elaborate material with
which we were provided respecting the origins of s. 45"; 53 D.L.R. (3d) 195.
83 In civil proceedings, non-party representation before the Supreme Court of
Canada was innovated in Attorney General of Canada v. Lavell (1973), 38 D.L.R. (3d)
481, when a wide range of Indians' and women's organizations was permitted to intervene.
84 In Robertson and Rosetanni v. The Queen (1963), 41 D.L.R. (2d) 485, the
Lord's Day Alliance of Canada was allowed to intervene.
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in September 1974 may be welcomed85 for recognizing that the public at large
has an interest in the outcome of particular criminal litigation.
Laskin, C.J.C., was first appointed to the Bench (the Ontario Court of
Appeal) in 1965, the year in which the United States Supreme Court decided
the seminal case of Griswold v. Connecticut86 with the assistance of arguments
proposed by non-parties. He has noted that the United States Supreme Court
is "dealing in the main with constitutional issues, which take it into the very
heart of American political, social and economic organization," and that
"what influences the style is the greater hospitality that is shown by that
Court to extrinsic materials than is the case in either the Supreme Court of
Canada or the House of Lords."'87 The Chief Justice has expressed admiration
of the United States Supreme Court's willingness to recognize that "society
may be brought into the court-room in the issues that are shaped for legal
determination,"' 8 and has affirmed "I do not shrink from describing a court
in the Anglo-American-Canadian tradition as a unit of government."89 The
Canadian Supreme Court's discomfort with its quasi-legislative boldness in
R. v. Drybones,90 and its subsequent refusal to build upon, or even to follow,
this precedent on the Bill of Rights, suggests that a majority of its members
does shrink from such description. A political scientist has recently observed
that "Most of the judges [of the Supreme Court of Canada], to put it mildly,
do not seem anxious to assume the strong political role entailed in enforcing
the standards of a comprehensive Bill of Rights on the popular branch of
government." 9' Chief Justice Laskin's vision of the Supreme Court's creative
social role illuminates the potential of which the court fell short in the
Morgentaler case by taking an excessively narrow view of the issues raised,
the relevant law, and the role of the jury in determining the case.
2. The Post-conviction Charges
Viewing the Morgentaler affair in more detail and in retrospect, one may
query the procedural aspects of its aftermath, notably the bringing of a post-
conviction charge, and of ten additional charges after the second jury's
acquittal. It may be asked what purpose these were intended to serve in terms
of law-enforcement and penal policy.
The Supreme Court dismissed Dr. Morgentaler's appeal on March 26,
1975, and he entered prison the next day, but the Quebec Attorney General
85 Although some fringe groups opposed the Supreme Court's decision to admit
non-parties to contest constitutional points. The Canadian School Trustees Association,
for instance, urged the Justice Minister to impress upon the Court that it is not a policy-
making body.
86 381 U.S. 479. The right of privacy recognized in Griswild was the basis of the
U.S. Supreme Court's landmark decisions in the 1973 abortion cases of Roe v. Wade and
Doe v. Bolton, supra, notes 48 and 49.
8 7 Bora Laskin, The Institutional Character of the Judge, Lionel Cohen Lecture
(Hebrew University of Jerusalem) 17th series (1972) 10.
88 Id. at 15.
89 d. at 6.
90 (1970), 9 D.L.R. (3d) 473.
91 Peter H. Russell, The Political Role of the Supreme Court of Canada in its First
Century (1975), 53 Can. Bar Rev. 576 at 592.
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apparently remained unsatisfied that the criminal justice system had exorcised
the Morgentaler evil, and was not disposed to discontinue outstanding charges.
At least in part, the sentence imposed on July 25, 1974 may have seemed
insufficient, since the Crown Attorney had argued at sentencing that "juris-
prudence weighed heavily in favour of a long sentence";9' 2 appealing for a
longer sentence may have appeared incompatible, however, with bringing
further charges. The prosecution was clearly aiming at punishment rather
than public protection against Dr. Morgentaler's activities, which in any
event had ceased almost a year earlier (on May 30, 1974) under other
pressures, including those of revenue enquiries. The sentence of eighteen
months' imprisonment was to be followed by a three year post-release period
during which Dr. Morgentaler could perform abortions only within an ap-
proved institution; such a provision could have been attached to a probation
order upon suspended sentence, 93 and shows that restraint by incarceration
was not necessary to protect the public. Indeed, the sentencing judge found
that Dr. Morgentaler "represented virtually no risk to the life and health of
his patients.10 4
Similarly, rehabilitation could not have been the foremost motive of
further proceedings because the sentencing judge must have assessed the in-
fluence of this factor in determining sentence, since he could impose up to
life imprisonment. A further concurrent sentence of up to eighteen months'
imprisonment would add little to the point already made to the prisoner, and
a longer sentence on the same type of charge arising from closely parallel
circumstances would be unlikely. In assessing sentence, moreover, Hugesson,
A.C.J., adverted unfavourably to Dr. Morgentaler's lack of good faith in
evading the legal contest he had so publicly sought by recourse to procedural
devices to frustrate the 1970 proceedings. 95 This component of sentence could
not be an element of a later sentence as well. A consecutive sentence of
eighteen months or less may have been envisaged by the prosecution; such
form of sentence would show the accused to be at the mercy of the Quebec
law-enforcement personnel, who could progressively seek his cumulative
punishment until public or other pressure brought an end to the pursuit. 6
The deterrence of other physician-offenders from following Dr. Morgen-
taler may initially have been a motive of the prosecution. Dr. Morgentaler
was a highly qualified physician whose methods, published in the Canadian
02 J. p. Maksymiuk, supra, note 29 at 284.
03 Code, ss. 663 and 664.
o4 Supra, note 44 and supra, note 29 at 284.
5  Supra, note 44.
00 By chance, the initial sentence could have been genuinely rehabilitative, since
pressure of work may have contributed to aggravation of Dr. Morgentaler's heart con-
dition; his incentive to take rest and convalescence was greater when the alternative was
routine imprisonment. It may be doubted that the Quebec Attorney General was so
solicitous as to Dr. Morgentaler's health, although after his suspected heart attack in
prison, commentators pointed to the consequences in public opinion of Dr. Morgentaler,
a survivor of the Auschwitz and Dachau concentration camps, succumbing to the Quebecjustice and prison systems.
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Medical Association Journal97 and featured in a CTV fim,98 are now em-
ployed in hospitals across Canada. Many specialists visited his clinic, where
the post-operative complication rate of 0.76 per cent showed the treatment
and environment to be safer than those of a hospital,99 and to which two to
three hundred physicians in Canada and the United States, including those at
hospitals in Montreal, referred patients. Had such deterrence been the objec-
tive, however, it may appear not to have succeeded fully, since two hundred
Quebec physicians came forward after Dr. Morgentaler's sentence and stated
not only their support of his cause but also their association with him and
abortions performed under the same inspiration,10 broadening the challenge
to the existing law the Morgentaler prosecution might have been intended to
resolve in favour of the status quo. In any event, deterrence of others would
not justify further proceedings against Dr. Morgentaler after his conviction
and imprisonment.
It may well be that the Quebec Attorney General was genuinely indif-
ferent as to sentence' 0 ' in that the further proceedings were directed to other
aspects of the affair. Having conducted a running battle with Dr. Morgentaler
since about 1970 and having experienced considerable frustration from his
procedural ploys and public provocation, the Attorney General's office may
have acquired an institutional dynamic to pursue him as its special bte
noire,102 and be loath to seem to yield to the preferences of his sympathisers
at the point where the Law Officer's officials believed they could win. They
may have been seeking institutional and personal vindication in obtaining ajury conviction, or, as the richest prize, Dr. Morgentaler's admission of
guilt.103 In any event, they would grow more, rather than less, resolved in the
face of jury repudiation, and would immediately hit back, tenfold.10 4
Imputing less than worthy motives to the Quebec prosecuting authorities
may seem poor criticism and itself discreditable, yet this is part of the dilemma
unavoidably raised by the post-conviction conduct of this case. Indeed, those
9 7 Supra, note 4.
98 In May, 1973; see J. P. Maksymiuk, supra, note 29 at 269.
9 9 See, generally, supra, note 29 at 279-81.
100 Globe and Mail, July 31, 1975.
101 See, generally, Brian A. Grosman, The Prosecutor: An Inquiry into the Exercise
of Discretion (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969) especially at 53-54.
102 For the capacity of institutions to develop a demonology, see, the $35,000
awarded by Solomon, J., of the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench, against the Manitoba
Vegetable Producers Marketing Board. After a producer unsuccessfully challenged the
Board's constitutionality, the Board malicoiusly harrassed him by bringing three prosecu-
tions (two dismissed, a guilty plea on the third) and two petitions in bankruptcy (one
dismissed, one stayed), and by then coercing other companies not to employ members
of his family. See, Gershman v. Manitoba Vegetable Producers' Marketing Board, [1976]
2 W.W.R. 432. For a better-known instance of institutional harassment, see, Roncarelli
v. Duplessis (1959), 16 D.L.R. (2d) 689.
10 3 Indeed, the federal Attorney General, Otto Lang, observed in Parliament that,
"if a conviction has been registered.., other charges... are often pleaded guilty to by
counsel on behalf of the defence. These are the sort of procedures that one would expect
to find"; 119 Can. H. of C. Debates (July 15, 1975) at 7614.
104 Globe and Mail, June 11, 1975.
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opposing the Humanist philosophy advocated by Henry Morgentaler and
expressed in his clinic's operation, would not necessarily regard persistence
in pursuit of him as unworthy. Nevertheless, confidence in the Quebec
prosecuting authority's detached, quasi-judicial approach'0 5 to this case is
hard to maintain. Zeal for aggressive pursuit of Dr. Morgentaler, evidenced
in public statements by the provincial Justice Minister and Attorney General,
and the prosecuting Crown attorney, ran beyond the prosecutor's normal con-
viction in the merit of his case. One may be driven from the immediate circum-
stances of this case, which threatened a sequence of ten jury trials after
disposal of the second appeal against jury acquittal, and eight trials after a
third jury acquittal at re-trial, to consider another important, more general
question: the control of oppressive proceedings.
3. The Control of Oppressive Proceedings'06
Oppression in prosecution may popularly be claimed to arise from two
main sources: discrimination, and harassment by repetition. Canadian courts
have yet to show their potential to control other than purely procedural im-
propriety in the instigation of criminal proceedings. This may be attributable
to prosecutors' moderation and good sense, but also to the judicial reticence
shown by the Supreme Court to take policy decisions open to political critic-
ism. 10 7 English courts have been more prepared to impose standards upon
prosecutors, however, regarding the discretion both to prosecute and to decline
to prosecute; 0 8 and courts in the United States are beginning to tackle oppres-
sion by discrimination, of which, some allege, Dr. Morgentaler has been the
victim.100
While Dr. Morgentaler was clearly the central figure at his clinic, and
had taken initiatives to publicize to the profession and to the public his
methods and their availability,"0 he was by no means acting alone in obtaining
clients. Other physicians, in and out of hospitals, advised women seeking
abortions to consult him, and collaborated in the ways two hundred Quebec
doctors subsequently identified. Despite their counselling, aiding, and abetting,
however, and the indictable offence against s. 251(2) each of the six or seven
105 The (Ouimet) Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections; Toward Unity:
Criminal Justice and Corrections, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969) at 44 observed, "That
the attorney general and the law officers of the Crown have a discretion as to whether a
prosecution should be initiated has never been doubted. This discretion must be exercised
in a quasi-judicial way in accordance with the requirements of the public interest."
106 This treatment is confined to proceedings instigated by the same provincial
Attorney General, and does not consider multiple proceedings by a provincial and
federal authority, nor by two or more provincial authorities. On these matters, see,
Martin L. Friedland, Double Jeopardy (Oxford: Clarendon, 1969) and Jeffrey S. Raynes,
Federalism v. Double Jeopardy: A Comparable Analysis of Successive Prosecutions in
the U.S., Canada and Australia (1975), 5 Calif. Western International L.J 399.
1
0 7 Supra, note 91.
108 See, generally, Bernard M. Dickens, Control of Prosecutions in the United
Kingdom (1973), 22 International and Comparative L.Q.1, and, regarding the United
States, Roger P. Joseph, Reviewability of Prosecutorial Discretion: Failure to Prosecute
(1975), 75 Columbia L.R. 130.
109 For instance, 119 Can. H. of C. Debates (April 22, 1975) at 5100 and (May
29, 1975) at 6250, per Stuart Leggatt, M.P.
110 Supra, notes 97 and 98 and accompanying text.
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thousand women Dr. Morgentaler claimed to have aborted were at risk of
committing, only he appeared to be charged."' This selectivity seems to in-
dicate discrimination. It does not follow, however, that such discrimination
was necessarily unjust discrimination. The women were involved only in an
episode, but Dr. Morgentaler was engaged in a practice.1 2 Moreover, he was
also engaged in a "public challenging of the authorities to prosecute him,""13
so that the claim that he was victimized by the first charge may not be easily
maintainable.
Nevertheless, the question remains in principle of whether unjust dis-
crimination is committed by a prosecutor against one defendant when many
others have been involved in the conduct for which he alone is charged. Courts
and the legal literature in the United States are coming to recognize that such
selectivity in prosecution, which awards an immunity to those not prosecuted,
can constitute an illegality against the one charged when the basis of selection
is, for instance, racial, political or religious." 4 Acceptance of the argument
that charging one defendant is irregular because others equally liable to be
charged have not been bears the obvious potential of preventing anyone from
being the first to be charged, especially when a member of a majority group
may also complain of suffering relative disadvantage by the favour shown to
minorities to redress their suspected underprivilege." 5 The joint or parallel
prosecution of suitably representative defendants, to forestall the charge of
unjust discrimination, raises problems too complex to consider here. Canadian
courts have no concept of equal justice in this regard, notwithstanding section
1 (b) of the Bill of Rights;" 6 while they might, in separate proceedings, con-
sider the regularity of not prosecuting suspects not charged, 117 they would
make no concession on grounds of unjust discrimination to the defendant
against whom proceedings have been commenced.
'
1 11 In fact, three doctors and a nurse associated with Dr. Morgentaler also faced
charges; see, Globe and Mail, April 30, 1974. His former chief nurse, Johanna Cornax,
was arraigned on a preferred indictment, and a plea of not guilty was entered at her trial
when she refused to plead; see, Globe and Mail, June 15, 1974. The prosecution's request
for postponement of her trial, pending the Quebec Court of Appeal's decision on Dr.
Morgentaler's second jury acquittal, was granted on January 5, 1976; see, Globe and
Mail, January 7, 1976.
"
2 The English Inter-Departmental Committee on Abortion, 1939, observed that
"in practice, proceedings are rarely instituted against a woman who has had an illegal
abortion... the view taken by the police is, we gathered, that the prosecution of the
abortionist, who may have a widespread practice, should be their primary aim, and
since the woman's evidence is required against him, proceedings against her are not
taken; para. 135, quoted in Bernard M. Dickens, Abortion and the Law (London: Mac-
Gibbon and Kee, 1966) at 86.
"3 Per Hugessen, A.CJ., at 42 D.L.R. (3d) 439.
"4 See, Andrew B. Weissman, The Discriminatory Application of Penal Laws by
State Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Officers (1974), 9 Northwestern Univ. L.R. 489; Mark
L. Amsterdam, The One-Sided Sword: Selective Prosecution in Federal Courts (1974),
6 Rutgers-Camden LJ. 1, and Michael P. Cox, Discretion - A Twentieth-Century
Mutation (1975), 28 Oklahoma L.R. 311.
15 See, for instance, De Funis v. Odegaard (1974), 94 S. Ct. 1704 (U.S. Sup. Ct.).
116 Supra, note 47.
"7 As did the English Court of Appeal in R. v. Commissioner of Police of the
Metropolis, ex p. Blackburn, [1968] 2 W.L.R. 893.
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Oppression by repetitious charging is more germane to the Morgentaler
case, since if his seized clinical records are complete, his liability to an
eighteen month consecutive sentence of imprisonment for each possible offence
would amount to a total detention of well over ten millennia. The House of
Lords in 1964 had to consider in principle a court's general discretionary
power to quash or stay a second indictment when to try it would be oppressive
to the accused. The facts in the case of Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecu-
tions" s differed from those in Morgentaler in that the second indictment re-
lated to the same incident for his involvement in which the accused had al-
ready been convicted of murder; the conviction being quashed on appeal.
The first trial judge had ordered an associated robbery charge to remain on
the file; following the defendant's successful murder appeal, this charge was
revived, the second trial judge then finding that he had no discretion to stay
that indictment.119 Lords Devlin, Pearce and Reid concurred in the majority
decision that a trial judge has a discretion to stop a prosecution, 120 but Lords
Hodson and Morris of Borth-y-Gest dissented on this point.
Lord Pearce opened his judgment with the proposition that "the court
has an inherent power to protect its process from abuse,"'' but Lord Morris
of Borth-y-Gest observed that, while this is so, it does not enable a court to
order that a prosecution be dropped "merely because of some rather imprecise
regret that an accused should have to face another charge."1' 2 The Morgen-
taler case involves the issue not just of "another charge", but of another
charge and another charge and another charge; a point might come when
the public becomes outraged at the prosecution's unremitting and merciless
pursuit of an individual.
Lord Devlin also noted "the courts' duty to conduct their proceedings
so as to command the respect and confidence of the public."'tm Lord Morris
viewed each charge in isolation rather than as part of a continuing public
process of law-enforcement, finding that "there is no abuse of process if to a
charge which is properly brought before the court and which is framed in
an indictment to which no objection can in any way be taken there is no plea
such as that of autrefois acquit or convict which can successfully be made."' 24
This narrow interpretation of "abuse of process", relegating it to a legal term
of art, was rejected by the majority of the court, who saw abuse as a matter
118 [1964] A.C. 1254.
110 He added that, if he had a discretion, he would not have exercised it against
the prosecution on the particular facts: see, id. at 1339.
1 2 0 In R. v. Riebold, [1967] 1 W.L.R. 674 this power was invoked to stop a
prosecution irrespective of the possibility of the defendant's guilt. In R. v. Bros. (1901),
66 J. P. 54 at 55, regarding commencement of proceedings, Lord Alverstone, C., stated
that "I do not think it can be disputed that justices may, in the exercise of their discretion
refuse to issue a summons, even if there was evidence of an offence before them if they
considered that the issue of a summons would be a vexatious and improper proceeding."
The Quebec Attorney General overcame such monitoring of his discretion to prosecute,
however, in proceeding by his preferred indictment.
121[1964] A.C. 1254 at 1361.
122 Id. at 1302.
123 Id. at 1353.
124 Id. at 1304.
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of social and judicial evaluation based on all of the surrounding circumstances.
Lord Devlin expressed the opinion that "if the Crown were to be allowed to
prosecute as many times as it wanted to do on the same facts, so long as for
each prosecution it could find a different offence in law, there would be a grave
danger of abuse and of injustice to defendants."-2 5 It may be proposed that
this danger can arise not only in charging different offences on the same facts,
but also in charging the same offence on different facts. The countering
argument that the judge can accommodate the defendant's history of prosecu-
tion in his sentence, giving a concurrent or suspended sentence for later
charges, disregards the defendant's emotional and financial expenses of the
trial process itself.
The House of Lords in Connelly failed to draw a necessary distinction
between a court's power to prevent abuse, and the identification of abuse itself.
It may appear in principle that a court need not passively submit to an abuse
of its process, but it is difficult to discover whether a judge may find abuse
when a procedurally regular prosecution is brought before him. The majority
of the House of Lords, applying a social criterion, considered that a court
can decline to proceed with a case regular in itself because of its oppressive
context.120 The minority rejected this idea, however, limiting the identification
of abuse to an esoteric procedural irregularity in the particular case, analogous
to violation of the double jeopardy principle.
The Canadian disposition to the issue is not clear, but in a powerful
passage of a judgment (that may have been obiter), in the Supreme Court in
1971, Pigeon, J., alligued himself with the dissenting law lords in Connelly.
In R. v. Osborn, he observed that he could "see no legal basis for holding
that criminal remedies are subject to the rule that they are to be refused
whenever in its discretion, a Court considers the prosecution oppressive."'12 7
This view, supported by Martland and Judson, 3J., was not accepted by Hall,
Ritchie and Spence, JJ., who concurred in the result on the basis of a judg-
ment narrowly confined to the facts of the case, where no irregularity was
found, without addressing themselves to the issue in principle; Chief Justice
Fauteux made the court unanimous, but gave no reasons at all.
Pigeon, J., was dealing with a case of further charging following acquittal
or quashing of a conviction, and with the initial laying of incorrect charges
or pursuit of other defective procedures. His comments do not directly apply
to the bringing of a succession of further charges following a conviction, at
trial or on appeal. Nevertheless, the spirit of his judgment suggests that a
defendant cannot look to Canadian courts for protection against oppression
by the instigation of proceedings valid in themselves.
This spirit is disappointingly consistent with the Supreme Court's
tolerance of unfairness in law-enforcement and prosecutorial procedure, re-
125 d. at 1353.
120 Finding support, perhaps, in the observation of Lord Alverstone, CJ., in R. v.
Bros., supra, note 120.
127 [19711 1 C.C.C. (2d) 482 at 491.
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vealed particularly in R. v. Wray. 28 The Court's restrictive approach to this
issue, focussing on non-compliance with narrow legalities as the exclusive
source of irregularity, and disregarding the oppression perceptible from only
some little distance removed from the legal interstices of the case, risks dis-
crediting the administration of justice. Members of the public are increasingly
coming to see justice as a social concept which they can identify in operation
and whose presence they can evaluate. They do not adopt the lawyer's vision
of "justice according to law." They turn to lawyers to distinguish legality
from illegality, but know for themselves the distinction between justice and
injustice, using their sense of justice to judge the law and its operation. The
legal admissibility of illegally obtained evidence, permitted in Wray, gives
licence to the police to ignore and violate the law on the accused's rights,
confident that their illegality will be of no account if the accused is shown
guilty. A prosecuting authority may be equally confident that the accused's
conviction in oppressively brought proceedings affords the authority public
exoneration. The search for truth is, of course, important, but Arthur
Maloney, Q.C., the Ontario Ombudsman, has recently pointed out, especially
regarding the Wray case, that the search for truth may cost too much of the
freedoms our society prizes.1 29 A guilty suspect may have to go free, not that
an innocent suspect shall not be convicted, but that society itself shall preserve
its optimum freedom from unfairness and oppression.
An indication that the courts can and will resist oppressive prosecutions
exists, however, in R. v. Thorpe.130 In that case, an Ontario County Court
stayed proceedings the Crown had delayed for three years, on the ground that
their dilatory presentation put both the complainant and the accused at dis-
advantage, for instance, in the defendant organizing his evidence. This prin-
ciple may be relevant to the Morgentaler case, in that a parliamentary protest
has already been made against the Quebec Attorney General taking up charges
in June, 1975 regarding alleged offences committed in mid-August, 1973 and
possibly earlier,13' when the evidence was available to the prosecution through-
out the intervening time; in January, 1976 the prosecution obtained permission
to postpone the trial further.132
The problem raised by the proposal that correct practice is to prosecute
all charges in the same indictment (if none is for murder), faces the counter-
vailing concept of oppression by multiple charging. It must be noted that
Hugessen, A.C.J., granted the defence motion at first trial requiring the
prosecution to select only one of six charges to pursue, and that Bisson, J.,
declined to allow five charges to be tried together at Dr. Morgentaler's second
128 See, [1970] 4 C.C.C. 1, and (1973), 10 C.C.C. (2d) 215. For a fascinating in-
sight into the human dynamics of this case, see, Robert J. Carter (defence counsel) in
Criminal Trials: A series of talks given by criminal lawyers analysing their own cases
(Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, 1975) at 40-154.
129 Globe and Mail, November 25, 1975.
130 (1973), 11 C.C.C. (2d) 502; see, also, R. v. K. (1972), 5 C.C.C. (2d) 46 (B.C.
Sup. Ct.), and Re Regina and Rourke (1976), 25 C.C.C. (2d) 555 (B.C.C.A., leave
granted to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada).
131 Supra, note 62.
l 32 Supra, note 63.
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jury trial. The undesirability of unnecessarily long indictments has been
judicially noted,133 not only because the jury may become confused in a welter
of differentially relevant evidence, but also because the defendant may be
harassed; the rock of his innocence on certain counts being eroded by the
dripping of evidence of guilt from others. A pressure favouring a long indict-
ment may be the scope this opens up to the Crown Attorney in plea bargain-
ing, but a negative pressure is the fact that, once conviction is secured upon
major counts, sentence will probably not be materially increased by additional
counts of which the defendant is convicted at the same time. This may provide
an answer to the dilemma of prosecuting the multiple offender; once his guilt
is shown, each further joint charge adds a decreasing increment to punishment,
until an optimum sentence is reached irrespective of guilt on additional
charges.
Beyond judicial control of the Crown Attorney's discretion lie administra-
tive and parliamentary or political controls. The Crown Attorney, as an
Ontario statute expresses his position, "is the agent of the Minister of Justice
and Attorney General for the purposes of the Criminal Code,"' 34 and is there-
fore subject to ministerial administrative direction. The minister is answerable
to his provincial legislature for the policy and quality of his direction, including
use of his discretionary power under s. 508 to stay proceedings he considers
should not have been brought or continued.'35 Parliamentary control is likely
to confine itself to general matters rather than extend to day-to-day decisions,
but Parliament would not be precluded by the sub judice prohibition from
questioning and even censuring the minister regarding a particular decided
case or a potential case.
Law-enforcement is primarily a provincial matter, 38 and the federal
government may be very reluctant to seem to be overbearing in the context
of any particular case. There is a general federal governmental responsibility
for Criminal Code matters, however, and the Minister of Justice, in his
capacity as federal Attorney General, may be prepared to address a provincial
Law Officer on its enforcement. Discussing the second Morgentaler acquittal
in Parliament, when the Justice Minister was asked by Edward Broadbent,
M.P. "Will the minister approach the Quebec Minister of Justice and urge
him not to appeal yesterday's decision . . .?" he replied, "I think it would
be rather unusual for me to volunteer to give advice to the provincial Attorney
General. It is really within his jurisdiction to institute and continue proceedings
to the point where he feels it is satisfactory.' 37 When the issue was raised
again, however, the day after the Quebec prosecutor appealed and laid ten
further charges, the federal Justice Minister said:
The other day some honourable members wondered whether I am sometimes
133 R. v. Shaw, R. v. Agard, [1942 2 All E.R. 342 (C.C.A.) and R. v. Hudson
(1952), 36 Cr. App. R. 163 (C.C.A.).
134 The Crown Attorneys Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 101, s. 11.
135 See, generally, Connie Sun, The Discretionary Power to Stay Criminal Proceed-
ings (1974), 1 Dalhousie L.J. 242.
3 6 For the concurrent or residual prosecuting powers of the federal Attorney
General, see, R. v. Pelletier (1975), 28 C.R.N.S. 129, especially at 140.
'37 119 Can. H. of C. Debates (June 10, 1975) at 6597.
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reluctant to comment to the Attorneys General about the way in which they
carry on their functions. I may very well wish to do so or feel obliged to do so,
if I feel that in any way they are interfering with the application of the law or
departing from the very important traditions of Attorneys General functioning as
officers of the court to apply the law and apply their discretion in that context.
I cannot see that kind of departure in this circumstance.' 3 s
The federal minister does not have ultimate control, since he has no
power to stay provincial Criminal Code proceedings under s. 508, and accord-
ingly he is not answerable to the federal Parliament for failure to regulate the
bringing of an oppressive case. Such control as exists can be exercised by a
provincial Parliament through its regulation of the provincial Attorney Gen-
eral. This is compatible with the tenor of the judgment of Pigeon, J., in Os-
born, placing control in the political rather than judicial arena; control in a
particular case is exercisable, however, only by censure ex post facto.aO
4. Justice, Truth and the Jury
The layperson's sense of truth and justice, and the respect that should
be paid to it, lie close to the centre of the Morgentaler affair. Jurymembers
take an oath to do justice according to law, upon the details of which the
judge instructs them, but this may not prevent them in practice from inter-
preting the facts to do justice, or injustice, despite the law. The jury's potential
for injustice is moderated, however, by the judge's power to direct their verdict
of acquittal, the prosecutor's discretion to seek judicial leave to offer no
evidence or otherwise to discontinue a trial he fears may result in unjust con-
viction, and, of course, appellate jurisdiction to quash conviction. Unjust
acquittal is no less a danger, but the perjured jury that acquits the oppressed
defendant has an honourable history in the common law tradition. 40 The
1581d. at 6646-47 (June 11, 1975).
130 On the general reluctance of Parliament to intervene in an Attorney General's
discretion regarding a potential case, see, Bernard M. Dickens, The Prosecuting Roles of
the Attorney General and the Director of Public Prosecution, [1974] Public Law 50, and
supra, note 112; on the identity of Canadian and English practice, see, Locke, J., in
Boucher v. The Queen (1955), 110 C.C.C. 263 at 271 (Sup. CL Can.).
140 Blackstone referred to this as "pious perjury". When statute provided the death
penalty for a wide variety of property offences involving more than a small sum, "the
common practice of the juries of . . . understating the value of stolen property was
largely responsible for the virtual suspension of the operation of many capital statutes":
L. Radzinowiez, A History of English Criminal Law, Vol. 1 (London: Stevens & Son,
1948) at 95. See, also, 329-30 for "remarkable instances of 'pious perjury' [which] in-
dicated the futility of enacting laws whose severity would occasion the disapproval of
public opinion." Much reform of harsh law, especially involving severe punishment, has
been inspired by juries' refusal to convict; indeed, the call for more moderate maximum
penalties often came from more reactionary interests despairing of the acquittal rate
under existing harsh laws. Modern instances of greater leniency compelled by juries'
reluctance to convict for severe crimes include the creation of the crimes of infanticide,
since juries would not convict the mother of murder or manslaughter, and in England,
causing death by dangerous driving (introduced by the Road Traffic Act 1956, s. 8),
since juries would not find manslaughter. The range of special treatments for young
offenders was of this origin, since juries would not condemn such offenders to the
severity of adult punishments. The triple refusal of juries to convict Dr. Morgentaler
when he faced life imprisonment, for aborting an unmarried student and a grade 12
schoolgirl who sought him out, speaks in historic tones as to the punishment, and perhaps
the very existence, of the crime.
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individual's greater democratic involvement in the legislative process, more-
over, has not eliminated the juror's influence to inform government of popular
sentiment. This is not to say, of course, that juries will necessarily record
sentiment sympathetic to permissive, liberal or advanced thought. Those who
praised the good sense of the Morgentaler juries may have been less impressed
with the Boston, Massachusetts jury that convicted Dr. Kenneth Edelin of
manslaughter following his legal abortion of an advanced fetus.141 The sound
credentials of the jury's verdict lie not in its liberality or resistance to the state
prosecutor's entreaties, but in its capacity publicly to express an authentic
opinion of private persons; when the jury is socially representative, it may
be the voice of 'the silent majority' of its community.
Even in the present iconoclastic age, juries are still prone to be idealized
and analysed in somewhat simplistic terms. Results of such studies, as the
1954 University of Chicago Jury Project, 14 published in 1966 by Kalven
and Zeisel, 143 have not shaken confidence in the jury system. The Morgentaler
case may indeed be the exception that proves the rule, because on this first
occasion of a jury acquittal being superseded on appeal by conviction since
the possibility was legislated in 1930,144 an unsympathetic Minister of Justice
was compelled to undertake, only fourteen weeks after the Supreme Court's
confirmation, to have the provision amended. While "to authorize a Court of
Appeal to enter a verdict of guilty on an appeal from an acquittal by jury
verdict is a major departure from the traditional principles of English criminal
law,"' 45 however, the sanctity attached to the jury's acquittal is completely
absent from a conviction; appellate reversal of a jury conviction, without
order of a new trial, is a common feature of the criminal justice system.
This favour shown to the defendant was explained (with a cultural re-
striction not really justified because of his audience), by Lord Devlin in giving
the 1957 Sherrill Lectures at Yale Law School when he said that:
[W]hen a criminal goes free, it is as much a failure of abstract justice as when
an innocent man is convicted. Each is a deviation on one side of the other, but
an injustice on the one side is spread over the whole of society and an injustice
on the other is concentrated in the suffering of one man. The English-speaking
peoples are so little vindictive that even those who have been most gravely injured
by the criminal soon cease to resent his acquittal; but the burden on an undeserved
conviction grows heavier rather than lighter as the years of punishment are pro-
longed. Since we know that the ascertainment of guilt cannot be made infallible
141 Excellent accounts of the Edelin trial were written by Barbara I. Culliton in
186 Science 327 (October 25, 1974); 187 Science 334 (January 31, 1975); 187 Science
814 (March 7, 1975).
142 Described in Jay Katz, Experimentation with Human Beings (New York: Russell
Sage Foundation, 1972) 67-109.
143 H. Kalven and H. Zeisel, The American Jury (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966).
See, also, A. P. Sealy and W. R. Cornish, Jurors and their Verdicts (1973), 36 Modem
L.R. 496 on the London School of Economics' Jury Project.
144 Criminal Code Amendment Act, S.C. 1930, c. 11, s. 28; see, Anglin, CJ.C., in
Belyea v. The King (1932), 57 C.C.C. 318 at 339-40. Pigeon, J., traced the evolution
of the present s. 613 at 53 D.L.R. (3d) at 196-203.
145 Per Pigeon, J., 53 D.L.R. (3d) 202.
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and that we must leave room for a margin of error, we should take care to see
that as far as humanly possible the margin is all on the side of the defence.' 46
The prosecution could appeal Dr. Morgentaler's acquittal on indictment
on "a question of law alone.' 147 To overcome the jury's finding of a necessity
justification of the accused's conduct, therefore, which in principle rests on
factual assessment, the prosecution had to invoke the "no evidence" rule.
This is comparable to the substantial evidence rule in the U.S., holding that
"the absence of evidence constitutes a question of law,"'148 as opposed to as-
sessing the cogency of evidence presented, which is a matter of fact for the
jury. An appeal court can clearly revise a jury's verdict more easily on grounds
of legal error than on error in factual determination. 149 The Quebec Court of
Appeal in Morgentaler responded to the legal point and was emphatic as to
the absence of evidence from which the fact of necessity could be found.
Rinfret, J.A., for instance, observed that:
[tihere is a total want of evidence demonstrating that it was not possible for the
respondent. to avail himself of the provisions afforded him under the law; there
is a total want of evidence that he communicated with one of the hospitals which
have therapeutic abortion committees in order to obtain from them a certificate
under s. 251(4) (d); there is a total lack of evidence that he even attempted to
exhaust the legal means before deciding by himself, without consultation, to per-
form the abortion, and this in a clinic neither accredited nor approved. 5 0
In the Supreme Court, Pigeon and Dickson, JJ., similarly found no
evidence of necessity in that Dr. Morgentaler did not demonstrate the im-
possibility of his compliance with s. 251(4).151 Chief Justice Laskin found
such evidence, however, regarding the woman's likelihood of attempting to
abort herself or of having recourse to 'back street' procedures, or perhaps of
suicide, and observed that "[t]he jury was entitled, if it so chose, to consider
this evidence as raising an emergency situation."' 52
In granting the jury's entitlement to find for itself, from the evidence
140 Patrick Devlin, The Criminal Prosecution in England (New Haven: Yale U.P.,
1958, revised ed. London: Oxford U.P., 1960).
147 Code, s. 605(1)(a).
148 Per Crete, J. A., 47 D.L.R. (3d) 222. In R. v. Nat Bell Liquors Ltd., [1922]
2 A.C. 128 (J.C.P.C.) at 149, Lord Sumner, discussing quashing a conviction, said: "If,
on some part of the case, which was material to the charge [in Morgentaler read "de-
fence"] and had to be legitimately established before the accused person could be con-
victed ["acquitted"], no evidence was forthcoming at all, this would be error of law,
which being duly brought to the notice of the superior Court would oblige it to quash
the conviction ["acquittal"]."
149By s. 613(4) (b), a court of appeal could allow the appeal and "(i) enter a
verdict of guilty with respect to the offence of which, in its opinion, the accused should
have been found guilty but for the error in law . . . or (ii) order a new trial." This
prevented an appeal court from entering its own verdict of guilty on grounds of thejury's error of fact, which in any event would no doubt be difficult to show and might
have to be in the order of perversity.
150 47 D.L.R. (3d) at 221.
15153 D.L.R. (3d) 194 and 214 respectively.
152 See, 53 D.L.R. (3d) 190, where the Chief Justice identified "evidence of the
accused that he feared that the pregnant woman would do something foolish unless she
was given immediate professional medical attention to relieve her condition and her
anxiety"; see, also, Dickson, J., at 214.
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taken as a whole, the existence of emergency, the Chief Justice opened up a
fundamental issue, namely the jury's use of its own understanding and beliefs
as to dominant realities in society. He noted that "what the Quebec Court of
Appeal saw in the defence of necessity was urgency of such a nature as to
make it impossible to obtain lawful abortion under s. 251 (4)," but he declined
to take the same stringent view on the question of urgency and impossibility,
since "there is a danger here in usurping the function of the jury on that
question according to the way in which it is defined." This may provide the
key to the rational and common-sense grounds upon which the first jury, and
probably the second jury, acquitted.
The Quebec Court of Appeal and the majority of Supreme Court judges
may have fallen victim to the myopia of the trained lawyer, whose analytical
mind distributes and confines submitted evidence to the point to which it is
directly relevant.'5 Ruling that s. 45 furnishes no defence in law, they did
not sufficiently appreciate how evidence admitted in regard to it could properly
indicate to the jury a pertinent issue of necessity, admissible under s. 7(3).114
The trial had shown that the aborted patient had an appointment at a Montreal
hospital scheduled for shortly after she saw Dr. Morgentaler, which the judge
described as a "circumstance which would very likely have permitted this girl
to have herself aborted, in the most complete legality, two or three weeks
later."-55 The jury knew that a female's abortion is certifiable by a therapeutic
abortion committee only when "the continuation of the pregnancy... would
or would be likely to endanger her life or health,"'1 6 and that the patient had
"consulted two physicians, one of whom was a gynecologist who did not
perform abortions. She contacted a few hospitals, but what they offered her
was too expensive or much too late. Someone in one of these hospitals recom-
mended the accused."'157
The Quebec Court of Appeal and Supreme Court majority then required
the accused himself (who held staff privileges at no hospital and to whose
application for "approved hospital" status for his clinic the provincial Minister
of Health had failed to reply), to contact accredited or approved hospitals
with therapeutic abortion committees, presumably whose charges the girl
student could afford, and try to persuade a committee to grant a certificate,
within the period when the six to eight weeks pregnant girl' 58 could be aborted
with maximum safety1 59 to preserve her health. Had such a requirement been
.53 For a study in how juries may apply evidence, see, Anthony Doob, Psychology
and Evidence in Martin L. Friedland, ed., Courts and Trials: A Multidisciplinary Ap-
proach (Toronto: U. of T. Press, 1975) at 40.
'54 Near the end of his charge to the jury, Hugessen, A.CJ., told them that "the
defence of s. 45 is close to the defence of necessity" (42 D.L.R. (3d) 454), although
not the same.
'55 Per Hugessen, A.C.J., at 42 D.L.R. (3d) 456. See, also, Laskin, CJ.C., at 53
D.L.R. (3d) 179.
156 Code, s. 251 (4) (c).
157 Per Belanger, J.A., at 47 D.L.R. (3d) 238.
158 47 D.L.R. (3d) 220.
159 "An abortion intervention performed before twelve weeks of pregnancy entails
four times less risk of death or of serious consequences," id.
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submitted to the jury, they would surely have rejected it as being utterly un-
realistic. Dr. Morgentaler did not undertake, and therefore called no evidence
of, such conduct, because it was self-evident that abortions were not so con-
veniently available in Montreal hospitals, and least of all in the French
language hospitals with whose practices the jury might have been more
familiar. That was why Dr. Morgentaler's clinic existed, and why the patient
had been referred to him by someone at a Montreal hospital.160 This point
may have been reinforced in that the trial judge had noted that the prosecu-
tion's medical expert witnesses "all admitted that they would not have per-
formed an abortion on Miss P., under any circumstances."''1
Jurors must reach a decision on the evidence called, and if one possesses
special knowledge of the case, he should serve not as a juror but as a witness.
Nevertheless, jurors' value to the administration of justice lies in their com-
mon-sense knowledge of ordinary affairs and relations. Any personal quality
of worldly naivety would render them unsuited to the important public
responsibilities of their office. This was the theory underlying the historical
exclusion of women from the jury,1 2 and which still excludes the young.
Jurors' familiarity with communal circumstances is the basis of the traditional
venue and venire rules of jury trial, requiring a suspect to be tried by a local
jury of an area having a nexus with the alleged crime. It was their members'
knowledge of local events and circumstances that historically brought the
institution of the jury into being; and when members first began to lack neces-
sary information, they were given a short time to acquire it. The parties' intro-
duction of evidence to assist the jury in finding the facts, related to population
and urban expansion with no concomitant information expansion, began the
jury's evolutionary transition from being witnesses to being judges of that
evidence. Jurors have never been required to abandon their understanding of
communal ways and circumstances, however, and may impartially resort to
this understanding to find that a specific incident represents an emergency,
whose solution comes within the social sense of necessity.
The necessity for abortion, assessed in terms of general social experience,
as opposed to the artificial and conservatively contrived terms adopted by the
Quebec Court of Appeal and Supreme Court majority, is identified by refer-
ence to the patient's circumstances, not to the physician's circumstances. The
physician can act outside s. 251 when he finds not himself but his patient in
necessity; the patient's necessity is the attending physician's necessity. Whether
Dr. Morgentaler's patient would have succeeded in obtaining (and affording)
160 At Montreal Royal Victoria Hospital; see, 47 D.L.R. (3d) 216.
10142 D.L.R. (3d) 451. Most were shown to come from hospitals with extremely
limited, if any, facilities for therapeutic abortion, and the prosecution's calling of an
expert from New York may have brought out the unwillingness of local physicians to
testify against Dr. Morgentaler, whose own expert witnesses tended to be from Quebec.
The prosecution was not aided by calling a medical expert witness against Dr. Morgen-
taler who was shown before 1969 to have referred a number of patients, including his
own secretary, to Dr. Morgentaler's clinic. At the September, 1976 re-trial, the prose-
cution called no medical expert witnesses, though claiming it could have called 200 to
1,000 doctors to testify against Dr. Morgentaler; see, Globe & Mail, September 16, 1976.
1 02 The ostensible ground was their inability to meet tests of property ownership,
but this legal inability was also based on belief in female worldly innocence.
[VOL. 14, NO. 2
The Morgentaler Case
a hospital abortion, which the trial judge found her circumstances "would
very likely have permitted,"l' 3 had she kept her later appointment, is specu-
lative. There was, however, ample evidence before the jury of her failure, up
to August 15, 1973, to find a sufficiently early and inexpensive facility,164 not
because she did not qualify for therapeutic abortion, but because of pressure
of demand on scarce local facilities. This evidence would have indicated to
the jury the inadequacy of abortion services in Montreal without submission
of further details.165 The jury would realize that a female's entitlement to a
safe, early abortion to preserve her health does not keep well; there must be
a limit to how many committees have to be consulted. In finding no criminal
guilt in Dr. Morgentaler's treatment of the patient, the jury was finding the
necessity not just of this operation, but of the existence of Dr. Morgentaler's
clinic. The second jury, of June, 1975, receiving similar evidence,' 66 was
apparently of the same view, as was the jury at the subsequent re-trial.
It cannot be contended, of course, that a defendant claiming only neces-
sity, who is acquitted when he adduces no evidence of necessity, is to be
immune from the prosecutor's successful appeal for a new trial. An appeal
court should be aware that jury members import into their decision on the
evidence an interpretation of its social setting, and should seek grounds to
make sense (as well as to make nonsense) of the jury's findings. That the
Quebec Court of Appeal did not consider the sense of the verdict is evident
in its members' several observations made in disregard of the evidence to
which the trial judge had referred the jury.
Rinfret, J.A., for instance, claimed that "[t]he abortion for which the
respondent is prosecuted took place in Montreal, within reach of the services
enumerated in s. 251(4). The respondent thus cannot claim remoteness, nor
non-access to the facilities furnished by the therapeutic abortion committees
established in several metropolitan hospitals.' 167 The trial court found evi-
dence, however, that the patient had "contacted a few hospitals, but what
they offered her was too expensive or much too late."'168 Similarly, Dub6, l.A.,
found the defendant had not "furnished any evidence that it was necessary
to proceed immediately with this abortion,"'169 but the trial judge adverted
to evidence of circumstances that "would very likely have permitted this girl
to have herself aborted, in the most complete legality, two or three weeks
later."170 The jury would have realized that urgency in therapeutic abortion
163 Supra, note 155 and text.
164 Belanger, J.A., supra, note 157.
165 In fact, a physician from Montreal General Hospital told the court that the
hospital's therapeutic abortion committee had to deal with sixty cases an hour, and Dr.
Morgentaler's patient, serving as a prosecution witness, said that when she applied to
Montreal General Hospital she was told that facilities would not be available until after
her first trimester had passed: see, J. P. Maksymiuk, supra, note 29 at 268-69, and
references in his notes 44 and 45.
166 Globe and Mail, June 5, 1975.
167 47 D.L.R. (3d) 220.
16s Supra, note 157.
169 47 D.L.R. (3d) 242.
17o Supra, note 155.
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increases with delay, but so does risk; moreover, a therapeutic abortion com-
mittee's grant of an operation is not certain, since the committee must take
account not only of the applicant's need, but also of availability of its hospital
staff and facilities.
Evidence of the patient's needs making her eligible for a s. 251 abortion,
and evidence of hospitals offering a too expensive or too dilatory service, show
that evidence of necessity did exist. Its credibility was a matter for the jury.
Chief Justice Laskin observed that:
[i]t must be an unusual case, indeed, in which an appellate Court, which has not
seen the witnesses, has not observed their demeanour and has not heard their
evidence adduced before a jury, should essay to pass on its sufficiency .. .and
thereupon to substitute its opinion for that of the jury and to enter a conviction
(rather than ordering a new trial) where the jury has acquitted.171
Respect for the jury system demanded that action be taken, as it has been, to
ensure that this should never occur again in Canada.
The Quebec Court of Appeal and Supreme Court of Canada majority
contrived to find no evidence of necessity by defining necessity very narrowly
on the facts of the case, and discounted the generality of evidence presented,
part of which was introduced on the legally unavailable s. 45 defence. That
made it no less evidence adduced before the jury, however, and, while not
directed to the necessity defence, such evidence was pertinent to it. In ex-
cluding the s. 45 defence, as they were entitled to do, and in dismissing the
necessity defence, as, it is respectfully submitted, they were not entitled to do,
the judges in effect required a directed verdict of conviction. The Court of
Common Pleas in Bushel's case"m terminated the common law courts' practice,
acquired from Star Chamber, of punishing jurymembers for finding "against
the manifest evidence" and compelling the nature of their verdict. This does
not regularize a finding against the evidence, of course, and a new trial may
be ordered, but it leaves jurymembers free to make their own decision on the
facts; their right is protected to disbelieve the prosecution's case and witnesses
and to refuse to convict. Dickson, J., adverted to the danger of the necessity
defence becoming "a mask for anarchy," 173 but, in debasing the jury's capacity
to determine a case against the state prosecutor, the judges shaped a mask
for tyranny.
5. The Penalty of Due Process
In imposing sentence, Hugessen, A.C.J., observed that:
[tihe accused says he is seeking justice .... The records of this court, of the Court
of Appeal and of the Supreme Court over the past four years are replete with
procedures taken by or on behalf of the accused with a view to frustrate and delay
his being brought to trial .... These are not the actions of a man seeking justice.
17153 D.L.R. (3d) 181. Even allowing that the time the jury spent considering the
s. 45 defence, and questioning the judge with regard to it, was considerable, the fact
that jury members took almost ten hours to reach a verdict may suggest that they found
at least some evidence of necessity to consider.
172 Sometimes Bushell's case, (1670) Vaugh, 135; 124 E.R. 1006.
173 53 D.L.R. (3d) 209, quoting Edmund Davies, LJ., in Southwark London
Borough Council v. Williams, [1971] 1 Ch. 734 at 746.
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They are those of one striving at all costs to avoid the evil day when the music
must be faced .... No one suggests, of course, that the accused should be
penalized for having acted as he did, but his delaying tactics go far to negate his
much-vaunted good faith.174
The propositions that a defendant who persistently required the prosecu-
tion to observe due process of law thereby destroyed his personal good faith,
and that, though claiming a legal justification his trial jury found convincing,
he was nevertheless consciously acting "to avoid the evil day when the music
must be faced," are novel, and corrupting of the entire process of lawful trial.
It is the claim of a modem legal system that the individual, and especially the
criminal defendant, has access to the full range of its procedures without legal
obstruction or penalty; neither penalty upon conviction, as Hugessen, A.CJ.,
recognized, nor the penalty of having recourse to procedural defence seen as
acknowledgement of guilt and evasion of its consequence. Even a defendant
deliberately challenging the law's interpretation and contending that his con-
duct falls within its licence is entitled to preserve personal credibility without
having passively to suffer impropriety by prosecutor or judge.
That such impropriety occurred to Dr. Morgentaler's prejudice is ap-
parent on the record. From the beginning of legal action against him, Dr.
Morgentaler experienced a series of prosecutorial excesses and procedural
irregularities, any one of which should be a matter of concern to a society
expecting observance of the law in the course of its penal enforcement. If the
judge at sentence felt bound to note the lack of good faith the defendant
showed by his use of due process, he might in justice have similarly reflected
upon the conduct of the Quebec law-enforcement agents in their recourse to
both due and undue process to impose arbitrary extra-judicial penalties upon
the defendant, and to place him at tactical disadvantage. The judge's observa-
tion on the number of the defendant's arguments with which court records
are replete, leading to an adverse finding on his good faith, was inequitable
without reference to how many of such arguments proved to be justifiably
raised.
Dr. Morgentaler's first encounter with legal process occured in mid-1970
when a search warrant was executed on his premises, and documents, instru-
ments and literature were seized. At the June, 1970 preliminary inquiry, his
counsel objected to the indiscriminate production en bloc of all documents
taken, irrespective of whether or not they were relevant to the charges then
under consideration; the judge, Fauteux, J., Sess., overruled the objection.175
In his judgment on the application for certiorari to quash the preliminary
inquiry, however, Shorteno, J., noted:
... the apparent illegality which was committed by those executing the search
warrant, on what appear(s) to have been a 'fishing expedition', by seizing every-
thing which they thought was 'good for the case' .... Not only were most of the
objects seized from petitioner's office done so without consideration as to their
relevance to the present case contrary to [s. 443(1) (information for search war-
rant)] but it was also thought, contrary to [s. 446(1) (detention of items seized)]. 70
17 4 Supra, note 44.
175 3 C.C.C. (2d) 192.
176 ld. at 193.
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The same design to impose the law-enforcement officers' opinion in
anticipation of judicial decision appears in the seizure in the August 15, 1973
raid on his clinic of three vacuum suction apparatuses;' 77 for evidentiary pur-
poses at trial, it would seem that seizure of one would have been sufficient,
but the seizure was apparently intended to serve more than that purpose.
Following Dr. Morgentaler being found not guilty of illegal abortion, the
prosecutor sought orders both to stop him from performing any abortions
pending outcome of the appeal, and to commit him to prison for breach of
bail conditions in addressing a public meeting and the news-media. Lamb, J.,
refused both orders.
The initial preliminary inquiry, of June, 1970, was also affected by other
improprieties. On considering the first challenge to its regularity, Desaulniers,
J., was satisfied of the judge's misconduct, but in the Superior Court, Shorteno,
J., considered Dr. Morgentaler's complaint by certiorari premature, and re-
peated that "[tihe question here is whether the proper remedy is sought and
not whether there is no remedy. 178 He offered the assurance that "I am quite
certain that had the learned Judge allowed the petitioner's attorney to make
representations to him beforehand about these most serious 'irregularities',
some of which may have gone to his jurisdiction, he would have undoubtedly
corrected them.' 79
Fauteux, J., Sess., did attempt to cure one irregularity at the June 12,
1970 inquiry by quashing the subpoena served on Dr. Morgentaler's defending
lawyer. Shorteno, J., later stated that:
[i]t is difficult for me to understand why a subpoena should have been sent to [the
defence lawyer] a day or two before the preliminary which had been fixed for the
12th and after the authorities knew ... that he was then petitioner's attorney. It
is also difficult to comprehend that the prosecution should have insisted on pro-
ceeding on the 12th, without consideration of petitioner's rights in the matter.180
Fauteux, J., Sess., refused the defendant an adjournment in these circum-
stances, apparently considering his cancellation of the subpoena adequate to
afford the accused proper and immediate representation, but Shorteno, J., was
satisfied that the adjournment should have been granted in fairness to the
accused and to his counsel.181
Dr. Morgentaler, a self-proclaimed publicist of the cause of widely
available abortion, and public opponent of the restrictive policies pursued
particularly in the province of Quebec, objected in addition to grant of the
prosecution's request for an in camera hearing at the preliminary inquiry.
Shorteno, J., upheld the inquiry ruling, however, finding that, since in abortion
cases the prosecution's witnesses might be embarrassed to relate in medical
detail the abortion techniques practised upon them, and the typical physician
177 Globe and Mail, June 11, 1975.
178 Quoting from Lord O'Brien, C.J. in R. v. Mahoney, [1910] 2 I.R. 695 at 704;
see, stupra, note 175 at 193.
171 Supra, note 175.
18 0 Id. at 195.
181 Id.
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would be ashamed of being so charged, the discretion contained in s. 465(1)(j)
was properly exercised in favour of closed hearings. 82 Indeed, he considered
it somewhat perverse and suspicious that Dr. Morgentaler wanted the public
to know the circumstances of his alleged crime, observing that "he appeared
to be most anxious, for some ulterior and undisclosed motive to be judged
in open Court.'u 83 The issue did not arise before the jury trials of October,
1973 and May, 1975, of course, because they were on indictments preferred
directly before the trial court, which obviated the need for preliminary in-
quiries. The resulting trials were held openly, however, the prosecution ap-
parently not requesting trials in camera permissible under s. 442. Nevertheless,
Hugessen, A.C.J., at sentence found in Dr. Morgentaler's active pursuit of his
procedural rights contributory evidence of his bad faith.
It seems likely that Dr. Morgentaler's vigorous contesting of the 1970
proceedings, concluded in January, 1972 with the federal Supreme Court's
refusal of leave to appeal the dismissal of his challenge to the preliminary
inquiry, was a significant factor both in their lapse into abeyance and in the
Quebec authorities' determination to bring further proceedings. They acted
on two fronts, their judicial initiative leading to the acquittals of November,
1973 and June 1975. While appeal was pending against the first of these, the
Quebec authorities opened the second front by signing ex parte judgment 84
against Dr. Morgentaler in the Quebec Superior Court for $354,799 for taxes
he was alleged to have failed to pay. The bona fides of this proceeding are
open to some question, not least because in closing Dr. Morgentaler's bank
account, the tax authorities obstructed his means to pay for legal representa-
tion compelled by subsequent criminal trials, 185 and impoverished his challenge
to the taxation proceedings themselves. This penal employment of due process
bears an ominous potential for oppression, and is worthy of separate attention.
Governmental revenue authorities are not averse to receiving their due
proportion of even illegal income and financial gains, so that the Quebec
Department of Revenue could prepare its revenue claim upon Dr. Morgentaler
without regard to the outcome of criminal proceedings, including appeals. In
fact, they based their claim upon selected evidence presented at the October,
1973 trial, not seizing the doctor's papers and tapes until after the revenue
judgment was signed; in particular, they accepted Dr. Morgentaler's own
claim as to the total of abortions he had performed since opening his clinic
in 1968, and applied an assessed free-income from each. Throughout the
operation of his clinic, he paid taxes in a routine way, but the revenue au-
thorities apparently came to consider that their entitlement was greater.
Hugessen, A.C.J., found regarding Dr. Morgentaler's fees that "the price
[$200] is hardly exorbitant and all the evidence confirms that he will reduce
182 In fact, there was no need for the prosecution to detail Dr. Morgentaler's
abortion technique, since he admitted that the procedure he performed was designed
and intended to achieve abortion. The prosecution's purpose was to show the extent of
Dr. Morgentaler's preparation for the clients he anticipated, and how speedily he
aborted them.
183 Supra, note 175 at 203.
184 The Quebec Taxation Act, Stats. Que. 1972, c. 23, s. 758(2).
185 Dr. Morgentaler's legal expenses are estimated to exceed $300,000.00.
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his fees, sometimes to nothing, in cases of hardship or inability to pay."' 86
The revenue authorities based their claim upon more uniform payment, how-
ever, and signed judgment for an optimum amount, so that the party liable
to pay could then take the initiative to challenge. The Quebec Department
of Revenue made no defence of its claim in contested proceedings.
The practice of revenue authorities putting their claims at a theoretical
optimum and leaving to the suspect taxpayer the burden of showing evidence
as to his lower liability offers the authorities obvious administrative advantages.
Their conduct in terrorem may be justifiable, however, only when it does not
impair the individual's means of contesting the assessment. The Morgentaler
claim smacks of overreaching, since upon signing ex parte judgment the tax
inspectors closed the bank account through which challenge could be financed,
and seized the documents the taxpayer needed for his accountant's researches.
Beyond that, however, the inspectors also took personal documents and inti-
mate tapes and diaries in a comprehensive seizure reminiscent of the search
undertaken of Dr. Morgentaler's premises by the police in mid-1970, later
condemned by Shorteno, J. The later seizure was in a sense more oppressive;
the police in 1970 sought evidence for charges, whereas in the February, 1974
revenue seizure, judgment had already been entered, and the revenue in-
spectors' conduct was aimed at self-vindication.
Revenue authorities may be justified in retaining evidence of undisclosed
income and in preserving sufficient taxpayer's assets to meet their properly
presented claims, but their revenue interests must be set against the interests
of the administration of justice, notably in an individual's capacity to defend
criminal charges and have them pursued in accordance with due process of
law, and his capacity to contest the revenue claim itself. In the Morgentaler
case it may be hard to resist the conclusion that the revenue authorities were
motivated by more than their duty to gather revenue, and that they were
employing due process of revenue collection penally, to achieve political or
philosophical objectives. For contradictory evidence, we need only to look to
see whether others shown to have engaged upon different means of achieving
financial gain through crime in the province of Quebec are similarly pursued
by the revenue authorities.' 87
D. EFFECTS UPON ABORTION LAW
In the Supreme Court, Dickson, J., opened his majority judgment by
denying that the court took any position of its own on the abortion con-
troversy. He stated that the court:
l8 Supra, note 41.
187 Their record is not good. The Commission of Enquiry into the Administration
of Justice on Criminal and Penal Matters in Quebec, in its report Crime, Justice and
Society (Quebec Government, 1969), noted that "In the opinion of various police forces,
the investigators of the Minister of Revenue . . . even avoid dealing with those cases
which would require them to confront individuals known for their illegal activities, or
who are known to have contacts with the underworld." On the other hand, how-
ever, it was noted that "The Minister of Revenue has extensive powers ... and he has
succeeded on many occasions ... in convicting criminals when the Minister of Justice
has previously failed to do so": vol. 3, tome H para. 143. at 130.
[VOL. 14, NO. 2
The Morgentaler Case
Has not been called upon to decide, or even to enter, the loud and continuous
public debate on abortion which has been going on in this country between, at
the two extremes, (i) those who would have abortion regarded in law as an act
purely personal and private, of concern only to the woman and her physician, in
which the state has no legitimate right to interfere, and (ii) those who speak in
terms of moral absolutes and, for religious or other reasons, regard an induced
abortion and destruction of a fetus, viable or not, as destruction of a human life
and tantamount to murder. The values we must accept for the purposes of this
appeal are those expressed by Parliament.' 88
In identifying Parliament's values, however, Dickson, J., chose to equate
them with the latter of these two extremes, since he found that "Parliament
regards procuring abortion as a grave crime which carries with it the same
maximum penalty as non-capital murder."'1 9 This statement was a significant
misrepresentation of the law, since by s. 218(4) life imprisonment for non-
capital murder was the minimum sentence imposable, rather than the maxi-
mum, as is the case for abortion.
This construction by reference to murder expressly indicates a judicial
evaluation. The judge might equally pertinently have equated the life sentence
for abortion with the identical sentence for many lesser offences than murder,
including breaking and entering a dwelling-house, 190 robbery and stopping a
mail conveyance with intent either to rob or to search,' 9 ' and failing to dis-
perse within thirty minutes of the riot proclamation being made.192 The
sentence of only eighteen months' imprisonment, which Hugessen, A.C.J.,
based upon the defendant's lack of good faith and "his massive and public
flouting of the law," which "forced the authorities to prosecute with more
vigor and the courts to punish him with more severity,"' 93 seems in itself a
rejection of the murder analogy, as may the prosecution's decision not to
seek leave to appeal against sentence. 194
The murder analogy, urged by most groups hostile to liberal legal
abortion, may be a significant obstacle facing a prosecutor seeking a jury's
conviction of an abortionist, since jurymembers' realization of the grave im-
plications of conviction may dispose them to be more demanding in requiring
the prosecutor to show not only that the accused's conduct was worthy of
conviction, but also that he is unworthy of sympathy. The jury's humane
instinct for "pious perjury" cannot be ignored;195 indeed, in his charge to the
original trial jury, Hugessen, A.C.J, expressly instructed them to disregard
the theoretically imposable sentence, since in practice it could be much less
than the maximum set by the Criminal Code.196 In appealing against the
18853 D.L.R. (3d) 203.
189 Id. at 206.
190 Code, s. 306.
191 Code, ss. 303 and 304.
192 Code, s. 69(b).
193 Supra, note 41.
194Under s. 605(1)(b); this decision is explicable, of course, on many other
grounds.
195 Supra, note 140.
196 Globe and Mail, November 13, 1973; Bisson, J., gave the second trial jury a
similar instruction, see, Globe and Mail, January 21, 1976.
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second jury's acquittal, moreover, the prosecution cited the defendant's
reference at trial to his liability, upon conviction, to life imprisonment. Were
the maximum punishment very severely reduced, it might even justify denial
of jury trial, excluding the elements of uncertainty, "pious perjury" and the
new bar on substituting conviction for acquittal at first instance that the jury
system introduces. There would be rich historical precedent for those prefer-
ring juries to be more strict in abortion cases to urge reduction of the maxi-
mum punishment, 197 although this practical reason for distinguishing abortion
from murder might be incompatible with their doctrinal basis.
Whatever legal defences may have been available to an abortion charge
before enactment of s. 251 (4) of the Criminal Code, 98 there can be no doubt
that this sub-section is now of primary relevance not just to a physician's
defence, but also to his protection against being charged. It is clear that he
cannot invoke as an alternative the defence under s. 45,199 but the common
law defence of necessity remains available to a physician, and indeed to anyone
else. This defence to abortion,200 would seem to be wider than the defence
under s. 45, since the latter provision is limited to "a surgical operation."
Abortion may be achieved, of course, by both surgical and non-surgical
means. Surgical abortion would be performed when the pregnancy was more
advanced, with a greater health risk to the mother and the chance of damaging
a resulting viable fetus. It would be incongruous to protect this surgery by
s. 45, but to leave early, safer non-surgical abortion of an embryo or a non-
viable fetus defensible only by the more rigorous defence of necessity. The
position clarified by the Supreme Court more consistently shows abortion
defensible only by s. 251(4) and by necessity admissible under s. 7(3), how-
ever performed. Further, necessity will uniformly protect both the practitioner
from s. 251 (1) liability, and the patient from s. 251 (2) liability, whereas s. 45
would protect only the person "performing a surgical operation."
The problem raised by the decision of the Supreme Court majority
arises from the traditionally restrictive approach taken to the necessity defence.
Indeed, Dickson, J., seemed not fully convinced of even its theoretical avail-
ability; he dismissed the historic English abortion case of R. v. Bourne201 as
"exceptional",20 2 and noted that the defence has never otherwise been raised
successfully, as far as he could ascertain, in England or Canada. It may be
pointed out, however, that failure of the defence on its facts does not show
its unavailability in law, and that appeal courts upholding convictions have
107 Supra, note 140.
108 By the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1968-69, c. 38, s. 18.
19 Supra, note 32.
200 Recognition of the necessity justification for abortion in Canada runs deeper
than the Morgentaler case. In 1909 when Lamont, J., of the Saskatchewan Supreme
Court, was hearing an extradition application regarding an abortion performed on a
female in the United States, he said that "From the evidence before me I cannot say
that the operation ... might not have been necessary to preserve her life, in which case
it is not unlawful": Re McCready (1909), 14 C.C.C. 481 at 485, quoted by Laskin,
C.1.C., at 53 D.L.R. (3d) 185.
201 [1939] K.B. 687; see, generally, Bernard M. Dickens, supra, note 112, ch. 2 B.
202 53 D.L.R. (3d) 208-11.
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not found trial judges in legal error in admitting argument and evidence of
necessity. Further, cases of jury acquittal upon a necessity defence may have
failed to find their way into the law reports, especially in England where,
until 1972, there was no prosecution appeal against acquittaL203 It must also
be remembered that those who break the criminal law in circumstances of
necessity may justifiably not be prosecuted,20 4 and that in the Morgentaler
case the prosecution recognized the common law defence of necessity pre-
served by s. 7(3).
Nevertheless, Dickson, I., felt able to concede only that "[i]f [the neces-
sity defence] does exist it can go no further than to justify non-compliance
in urgent situations of clear and imminent peril when compliance with the
law is demonstrably impossible."205 He added that "[t]he defence of necessity,
whatever that vague phrase may import, does not entitle a medical practi-
tioner, in circumstance of time and place such as those under consideration,
to procure an abortion on his own opinion of the danger to life and health,"200
suggesting that in different circumstances a medical practitioner may be so
entitled, and may act without the concurrence of a therapeutic abortion com-
mittee of at least three members. Accordingly, a defendant abortionist will
be called upon to show urgency to act to preserve the female's life or physical
or mental health, and that it was impossible for the female to comply with
s. 251(4) by approaching a hospital therapeutic abortion committee; this
may require the defendant to show that, as a physician, he could not approach
a committee on her behalf.
Dickson, J., referred to section 1 (4) of the British Abortion Act 1967,207
which relieves a physician from having to obtain a concurring professional
opinion before terminating a pregnancy, and from having to conduct the pro-
cedure in approved premises, "in a case where he is of the opinion, formed
in good faith, that the termination is immediately necessary to save the life
or to prevent grave permanent injury to the physical or mental health of the
pregnant woman." This sub-section imports the necessity justification judicially
approved in the Bourne case. The judge noted that the Canadian Parliament
has not chosen to legislate a dispensing provision similar to section 1(4), and
he declined to read such a term into s. 251. There is reason to believe, how-
ever, that the Canadian legislature does not intend to require the isolated
physician to stand by and let his patient, or another female he could assist,
die or suffer grave permanent injury to her physical or mental health. The
British Act also provides in section 5(2) that "For the purposes of the law
relating to abortion, anything done with intent to procure the miscarriage of
a woman is unlawfully done unless authorised by section 1 of this Act." The
1967 Act contains the entire abortion law, because section 1(4) introduces
the necessity justification. Section 251 contains no comparable section to
203 See, now, the Criminal Justice Act 1972, c. 71, s. 36, giving the Attorney General
a right of academic appeal on a point of law.
204 Lord Denning, M.R. in Buckoke v. Greater London Council, [1971] 2 W.L.R.
760 at 765.
2 o Supra, note 202 at 209.
2061d. at 211.
2 07 U.K. Stats. 1967 c. 87.
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section 5 (2), and presumably Dickson, J., would not read in this provision
either. Section 251 is accordingly not an entire provision as is the British Act;
the necessity defence remains applicable to s. 251, and the British section
1 (4) may well provide relevant words to express its silent presence in s. 7(3).
An obvious ground of impossibility of compliance with s. 251(4) is
that no hospital therapeutic abortion committee exists, or can be assembled,
in the area to whose medical services the patient reasonably has recourse,
and no hospital with such a committee is reasonably accessible. In these
circumstances of risk to life or health, non-compliance with s. 251(4) is
clearly more easily justifiable than where a local committee operates. This
legal point stands in contrast to conventional belief that the absence of a
therapeutic abortion committee makes it impossible for a hospital lawfully
to terminate a pregnancy, and that a physician cannot operate when such a
committee is unavailable to give certification. It may conceivably be the case,
indeed, that the same legal justification can be made out before a jury where
an accessible committee pursues a restrictive policy for doctrinal reasons, or
where its facilities are too expensive or over-extended, causing delay in com-
mittee consideration or in performing an operation. 208 The Criminal Code
provides no appeal system against a committee's refusal of an operation, but
equally it does not give any committee a veto power. A woman whose applica-
tion has been rejected by one committee may submit it to another, whose
members may in good faith find sufficient evidence of necessity to warrant
an operation under s. 251(4). Similarly, since a woman is entitled to seek
more than one committee's approval, she may argue, when refused certification
by the only committee she had time to approach, that her case was not
properly considered, 20 and that termination of her pregnancy was necessary
to preserve her health despite the committee's refusal, which can be explained
on grounds consistent with the presence of necessity as defined in s. 251 (4).
Clearly, when a therapeutic abortion committee is accessible, non-resort
to it, or abortion following its refusal of certification, becomes far more difficult
to justify. Unavailability of s. 251 facilities, however, for whatever reason,
is to be established by the defendant as a matter of fact, and a jury will assess
the evidence he adduces; it is not a matter of law to be determined by the
judge. The defendant's task of explaining that a committee would not, or did
not, make a necessary therapeutic facility available when a female's life or
health was at risk may appear formidable. It can be successfully undertaken,
however, as Dr. Morgentaler showed at his two jury trials; verdicts in his
favour were a finding of inadequate local s. 251 facilities. Committees are
not required to give reasons for refusing to certify an operation, 210 and it has
208 And also, perhaps, where a therapeutic abortion committee will certify an
operation as necessary, but adds unacceptable conditions, such as that the woman must
agree to be sterilized at the same time; see, Bernard M. Dickens, Eugenic Recognition
in Canadian Law (1975), 13 Osgoode Hall L.J. 547.
2o Supra, note 165, showing that the committee at Montreal General Hospital dealt
with sixty applications for abortion in an hour.
210 By s. 251(5) (a), a provincial Minister of Health may order a committee or any
member thereof to give him a copy of any certificate issued, with "such other informa-
tion relating to the circumstances surrounding the issue of that certificate as he may
require," but there is no power under the section to obtain grounds of certificate refusal.
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been seen that a defendant will be free to adduce evidence to explain refusal
compatibly with the presence of necessity to act to preserve life or physical
or mental health. As in any case of abortion outside s. 251, however, the
defendant will have to introduce some evidence of necessity for the jury to
assess, in order to avoid the effects of the no evidence rule.21 1 If the prosecu-
tion were to subpoena a committee and its records to show that the refusal
of certification was because it found no risk to life or health, the defendant
would still be able to call evidence to show that another committee might
have found otherwise.
A hospital is under no legal duty to establish a therapeutic abortion
committee,2' 2 although, since the Criminal Code makes the assembly of such
a committee a pre-condition to a hospital anticipating and routinely dis-
charging its responsibility to a female in its community when continuation of
pregnancy "would or would be likely to endanger her life or health,"2 13 a
public hospital failing or declining so to equip itself might be considered in
breach of its social obligation to the public. In legal terms, however, a hospital
board has an option as to whether it wants to commit its resources to supplying
an abortion service for its patients; its negative decision would not preclude
it, of course, from meeting an emergency with which it was suddenly pre-
sented. The matter concerns not its legal powers, but its decision upon the
distribution of the health-care facilities at its command. Indeed, a remarkable
feature of the post-1969 public debate on abortion has been the relatively
low profile maintained by the federal and provincial Ministers of Health,
and the prominence of the Law Officers.
When it was reported that in 1974 in Quebec only 27 of 281 hospitals
had the necessary committees to certify performance of this form of therapy
when female life or health was at risk, the federal Minister of Health, Marc
Lalonde, noted that "[tihey are public institutions and, in my view, should
be providing services demanded by the public. '214 No official suggestion has
appeared, however, of federal or provincial authorities imposing any legal
duty upon hospitals to make such provision. 215 In Quebec, patients' rights
are expressly confined to institutional facilities. The Health Services and Social
Services Act provides that "[e]very person has the right to receive adequate,
continuous and personal health services ... taking into account the organiza-
tion and resources of the establishments providing such services. 210
Moreover, when such a committee operates, no guidance as to how it
is to discharge the duty it assumes to reach an opinion upon the danger of
continued pregnancy to life or health exists in law, and none was offered by
211 Supra, note 148.
212 For a valuable study of the early operation of committees, see, K. D. Smith and
H. S. Wineberg, supra, note 51.
213 Code, s. 251 (4) (c).
214 Globe and Mail, March 31, 1975.
2 15 In the United States, by contrast, it was held in Doe v. Hale Hospital, 369 F.
Supp. 970 (1974), that a publicly funded hospital with abortion facilities could not
refuse to make them available.
216 Stats. Que. 1971, v. 48, s. 4.
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the Supreme Court. In August, 1970, the then federal Justice Minister, John
Turner, approved a broad definition of "health", covering psychological and
social health as well as the purely physical condition. This is consistent with
the concept of health applied by the World Health Organization, which in-
cludes "complete, physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the
absence of disease or infirmity. '217
The subsequent Minister of Justice, Otto Lang, preferred a more narrow
interpretation, however, and suggested that hospital committees -would be
acting unlawfully in certifying operations upon other than a strict basis.218
Even a strict basis may be more accommodating than it at first appears,
however, since Gilles Marceau, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of
Justice, has observed that:
[t~he danger for the pregnant woman's life or health is the only criterion in this
matter. If it is proven medically that financial, social or other circumstances en-
dangered or would probably endanger the mother's life or health, a certificate
may be given; but the decision must be based on reasons of real danger to life
or health, and not on social or financial factors as such.2 19
This seems to put emphasis upon the form and expression of certification
rather than upon the substance of the female's condition and circumstances.
Uncertainty in this area is clearly undesirable for hospitals and patients,
and contributes to uneven availability of abortion services. It may be a factor
in hospitals deciding not to establish therapeutic abortion committees, in
committees fearing to certify particular cases or to have too high a proportion
of successful applications, and in physicians in hospitals without committees
failing to respond as they think in their patients' best interests in medical
emergencies. Lack of definition somewhat eases the burden of the defendant
prosecuted for proceeding outside s. 251(4), however, in that he may offer
the jury evidence to support his personal interpretation of danger to physical
or mental health justifying his action on grounds of urgency. The degree
of urgency affects the test of reasonable availability of a hospital committee,
since if life or health is in immediate danger from pregnancy the female may
be aborted without prior committee approval even in a hospital equipped with
a committee. It may be believed that the legal need for obtaining approval is
not intended to obstruct treatment in a life-threatening or health-threatening
emergency, which fortunately is rarely experienced, but applies to pregnancy
termination that is elective to the extent that a woman's health would not be
chronically impaired by childbirth. In a sense, the lack of a hospital com-
mittee may make abortion upon grounds of necessity more, rather than less,
easily justifiable in law.
It must be asked, in relation to this point, what legal difference exists
between procedures under s. 251 (4) certification and by comon law necessity.
It may, for instance, be proposed that where s. 251(4) is applied, no offence
has been committed, whereas the procedure without certification is illegal,
217 Quoted in 119 Can. H. of C. Debates (May 29, 1975) at 625, per Stuart
Leggatt, M.P.
218 Globe and Mail, November 7, 1974.
210 119 Can. H. of C. Debates (April 22, 1975) at 5103.
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but the offence may be excused because of the necessity of the circumstances.
This distinction may affect decisions relevant to prosecution, but in principle
both propositions are over-simplifications. A physician acting in emergency
to save life or health is entitled to be regarded at least as a non-offender,
rather than as an offender who need not be reported to or investigated by the
police, or not referred to a Crown Attorney, or not prosecuted, or not con-
victed, or not punished, or not condemned by the discipline committee of his
provincial College of Physicians and Surgeons; he may be entitled to claim
that on the facts of the incident "the law of necessity"220 supplements or
overrides s. 251, furnishing an alternative source of legality.
On the other hand, not every certificate purported to be granted under
s. 251(4) may lead to an unimpeachable operation. The requirements for
compliance with the sub-section are technical, and unless an irregularity falls
under the de minimis rule, its effect will need to be considered. If, for instance,
a certificate has been granted and given to the applicant physician, but for
some reason he cannot perform the operation, which under pressure of time
has to be performed by another available physician who is "a member of a
therapeutic abortion committee for any hospital," 22' this would have to be
defended under s. 7(3), since s. 251(4) does not exclude from criminal
liability a member of such a committee "for any hospital". Similarly, a
certificate granted in terms of likely danger to health may be open to some
question when founded on a liberal interpretation of "health", for instance
accommodating the consideration that a woman in poor socio-economic
circumstances, over-burdened with care of existing children, is likely to ex-
perience reduced health levels in pregnancy and infant-care,222 and that a
pregnant woman's mental health may be impaired by anxiety about the
inimical social and emotional environment her child would enter; indeed, the
adverse effect upon the mother's mental health of learning of the committee's
unfavourable response to her application might weigh heavily in the com-
mittee's consideration.2 2 3
The effect of an arbitrary "health" definition is that it subverts the basis
of s. 251(4) certification, and may make the statutory scheme purely formal-
istic and unworkable in practice with any avoidance of capriciousness. If a
strict view is taken of when abortion may be certified by a committee, the test
may coincide with the urgent circumstances in which abortion may be per-
formed under the necessity defence without committee approval. If, on the
other hand, certification may be given on any other basis, it may seem hard
to consider the circumstances falling within the s. 251(4) statutory formula
of danger to life or health; that is, if s. 251(4) certification is co-terminous
with the necessity justification, there is no need for s. 251 (4), and if s. 251 (4)
220 Per Dickson, J., supra, note 202 at 209.
221 Code, s. 251(4) (a).
222 See, generally, Bernard M. Dickens, supra, note 208, part 4.
22 The basis of certification may be sought by a provincial Minister of Health,
see, supra, note 210, but it may be doubted that he would undertake to second-guess a
hospital committee expressing itself in correct form, according to the proposition of
Gilles Marceau, see, supra, note 219.
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standards are lower, there may be no need for an operation in the terms in
which it may alone be certifiable.
The view that certification is an essential pre-condition when the danger
to life or health is prospective, but not immediate, seems more likely to repre-
sent the legal position. It gives sense to Parliament's studied enactment, and
is consistent with medical distinctions between necessary and elective abortion.
A physician may respond to necessity on his independent initiative and judg-
ment, but an abortion at an elective stage is legal only upon the concurring
opinion of a majority of members of the therapeutic abortion committee of
the accredited or approved hospital where the procedure is to be performed.
In emphasizing that Dr. Morgentaler's acquittal was irregular because
he introduced no relevant evidence of necessity, the Quebec Court of Appeal
and the Supreme Court of Canada established that, had he introduced any
such evidence, the jury's decision would have prevailed.224 With termination
of an appellate court's power to replace jury acquittal with its own entry of
conviction, moreover, a jury verdict will always prevail in the future, subject
to an appellate court setting aside a jury's conviction. Demanding legal tests
may have been set by the courts to satisfy the requirement of showing neces-
sity, and the trial judge will have to inform the jury of these, but necessity
itself remains a matter of fact, to be decided by the jury. Provided that the
defendant adduces some evidence of necessity for his action, meaning evidence
to show that it was taken in good faith in some degree of urgency when s.
251(4) facilities were practicably unavailable, he may hope for the jury's
sympathy. His attempts to comply with s. 251 (4) requirements in the circum-
stances of the case may well influence the jury's views on the accused's good
faith. Indeed, a defendant who is not persuasive of actual urgency nor of the
unavailability of s. 251(4) facilities may be acquitted when he convinces
the jury only of his good faith. Abortion is not a crime of strict liability.
Acquittal would be in accord with the deeply traditional moral basis of the
criminal law, condemning an individual not simply because he did wrong,
but because he also intended wrong.
This consideration of effects of the Morgentaler case upon Canadian law
has ignored a political factor that may well prove to be the most powerfully
influential of all in shaping the future course of abortion law in Canada.
Common law jurisdiction is primarily exercised upon the basis of territoriality,
rather than upon the nationality basis that has provided the jurisdictional nexus
of civil criminal jurisprudence since the French Revolution. 25 Accordingly,
Canadians will not in principle incur criminal liability in Canada for what
they lawfully do in other jurisdictions.220 The most relevant foreign jurisdiction
to Canada is, of course, that of the United States, where since the January,
224 This was the basis upon which the Quebec Court of Appeal upheld the second
jury's acquittal; see, Owen, J.A., 27 C.C.C. (2d) 81 at 96.
225 See, generally, the Harvard Research on International Law (1935), Jurisdiction
with Respect to Crime.
220 Nor will it necessarily be unlawful in Canada to arrange to go to another
jurisdiction to do acts lawful there but unlawful here; travel agents, for instance, may
lawfully arrange gambling visits to Las Vegas.
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1973 Supreme Court decisions in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, abortion
has been available upon an accommodating legal basis 227 Major population
centres in Canada, such as Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver, are within
relatively easy access of the border, and many women with the financial
means cross it for the purpose of termination of pregnancy. Statistics Canada
abortion figures realistically include operations performed in New York
State,228 where incomplete figures for 1973 showed that 6,200 Canadian
residents, one in eight of the total of Canadian women having legal abortions,
obtained their operation. The legality of these procedures is confirmed by the
fact that such provincial health schemes as exist in Ontario and Quebec help
to meet expenses of these procedures when incurred by residents of the
province eligible for coverage of therapeutic treatments received out of the
province. At the September, 1976 re-trial, moreover, the crown prosecutor
actually asked Dr. Morgentaler why he had not suggested that the woman go
to an accredited hospital in the United States for a legal abortion, 29 a ques-
tion that does considerable violence to the moral pretence of Canadian abor-
tion law.
Constitutional and criminal law circumstances in Canada and the United
States are, of course, quite different, but social circumstances may not be so
different as to preclude a significant degree of cultural osmosis fashioning com-
parable if not common social evaluations. Even if an accused charged with
illegal abortion does not reinforce his necessity argument by pointing out to
the jury that the female concerned might have gone to the United States for
a lawful elective procedure, the jury may from its own knowledge be aware
of the more permissive legal situation prevailing there. The jury need not be
aware that public hospitals in the United States are under a legal duty to use
the facilities they possess to undertake abortion services2 0 to find unconvinc-
ing the view, whether urged by prosecutor, prosecution witness or judge, that
abortion is a crime tantamount to murder. Indeed, a feeling that the prosecu-
tion at the Morgentaler trials was over-stating the heinousness of the offences
in the circumstances of the females involved may have underlain the jury
acquittals; a jury's capacity to react more strictly when it considers a potential
life has been insufficiently respected, as perhaps in the Edelin case,M1 gives
greater credibility to the Morgentaler verdicts.
The trials of Dr. Henry Morgentaler may prove to mark a turning point
in Canadian abortion law and practice. He set out to force the issue of
227 Although a recent study has shown abortion services to be inadequately available
in the United States, especially in public hospitals which traditionally serve the poor;
see, The Alan Guttmacher Institute, The Unmet Need for Legal Abortion Services in
the U.S., 7 Family Planning Perspectives 224 (September-October 1975).
228 Globe and Mail, November 18, 1974. They exclude figures for other states,
however, such as Washington State, where many western Canadian women go for
abortion.
229 See, Globe and Mail, September 14, 1976.
2 3OSupra, note 215 and generally, H. F. Pilpel and D. E. Patton, Abortion,
Conscience and the Constitution: An Examination of Federal Institutional Conscience
Clauses (1974-75), 6 Columbia Human Rights L.R. 279, especially at 290 et seq.
21 Supra, note 141.
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abortion law reform, and will have paid dearly for any success he may
eventually achieve with his liberty, his financial security and, some believe,
his health. His campaign leaves the social controversy on abortion with no
improved prospect of resolving itself in consensus, and has served debate on
the moral issues only by assisting to illuminate its extremities. The jury system
and the values it symbolises will be the more secure for removal of appellate
power to replace acquittal with conviction. In both abortion law and criminal
procedure, his trials have caused the Canadian public to enquire about basic
issues in criminal law and its enforcement. One need not admire the man
himself, nor hold him in any special respect, to be indebted to him for forcing
to public attention important principles by which the administration of justice
is achieved. The Morgentaler case, involving issues of substantive law, the
quality of its enforcement and the interaction of legal process and society has
given cause to contemplate the different dimensions of justice.
